LIBRARY COPY

THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way"—however dimly, and lost among the host—as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—The Voice of the Silence

VOL. XV MAY 1944 No. 5

AN ARISTOCRACY OF THE MIND

It must be patent to the dullest wit that mankind in the mass has lost its bearings. We trudge on doggedly, describing circles in a wilderness that seems to have no end. Hardship, privations, misery are general today, but none the easier to bear for that. The wilderness with all its sufferings would be endurable if we were crossing it deliberately to find a Promised Land. But we have no such consolation; it was no lofty dream that beckoned us from the high-road of progress. We strayed aside lured by the *ignis-fatuus* of personal selfishness and national greed.

Major Sardar K. M. Panikkar, in the article that follows, points to a way out. It is an aristocracy of the mind for which he pleads, a co-operative effort today by the natural leaders of tomorrow—the intelligent youth of the world. "An Alliance of the *Élite*"—there is hope in the very words!

It should be easy for age to admit a failure now so obvious to all. It should not be too difficult to pocket pride and follow humbly on the trail that youth might blaze. But dare age altogether abdicate before its time? Is it fair to youth, born in the wilderness, to look to it alone to extricate itself and us from the pass to which our folly and our sins have brought us all?

What are the qualifications of youth for leadership? Youth is more cosmopolitan than age, more spontaneous, more generous, less hardened in its shell. But youth has other qualities to offset these. Youth cannot always tell fool-hardiness from courage, thrift from miserliness, caution from cowardice; and if the sympathies of youth are strong, so, often, are its passions too. Youth has learned fewer things that are not true than we have, but positively it is no wiser than the rest of us. And many of the world's educated youth, alas, have assimilated but too well the old harmful slogans, "Might is right," "My country, right or wrong," ideas of

race and cult superiority, ideas that have helped to bring us where we are today. We cannot blame them that they were apt pupils, but neither can we follow them unquestioningly.

A ship-captain these days could hardly lose his bearings, but if he did we may be sure he would not yield the helm to inexperienced hands while he sat back and wrung his own. No, he would turn to chart and compass and the starry map that Nature furnishes. Humanity is not without its charts; it needs primarily to study them. They are the great ideals put forward by all great teachers of the race; and those ideals and ideas are ever fresh, ever young. They can lead us out of the wilderness, truly; that leadership of youth perennial the world can wholly trust.

High ideals are more powerful than the materialism of this age or any age. But those ideals which can save us are dynamic, positive. The aim which Major Panikkar sets for his "Alliance of the *Élite*" is excellent—the prevention, at least for the future, of "the mental slavery which Power and Profit have enforced on the world." But can a negative aim, however good, give us the necessary impetus? Altruism, honour, courage, even-handed justice, human dignity—let the youthful intelligentsia and all men of good-will inscribe these on their banners to lead the world out of the wilderness and there can be no stopping their advance and ours. Dethrone expediency and selfishness as ruling motives and mental slavery will slink off with them into banishment.

But not all the *élite* are young. If our young men see visions, our old men too dream dreams. We need them both. Is it not true that the *élite* are such in terms, not of the body's youth or age, but of acceptance of such high ideals? Those most deserving of the name *Élite* are the great teachers of mankind and they are natural allies. In that sense an Alliance of the *Élite* there always is.

But there must be co-operation, too, among the rest, based on the recognition of such ideals and of our common brotherhood. Our common plight, our common sufferings, should teach us that, but even more the recognition of our common goal. A nebulous alliance there is now between right-thinking men and women everywhere, those in whom Tagore, in his *Creative Unity*, put his faith—

> the individuals all over the world who think clearly, feel nobly, and act rightly, thus becoming the channels of moral truth.

But the inadequacy of that intangible bond stands proven. Let us by all means have a formal Alliance of the *Élite*, both young and old, and let us not delay till it is formed to start the practice of the principles that, observed by all, would cause the wilderness to blossom as the rose.

AN ALLIANCE OF THE ELITE

[**Major Sardar K. M. Panikkar,** whom we are very glad to welcome to our columns, is no less well-known as a thoughtful student of affairs than as a Malayalam dramatist and poet of distinction. The subjects of his numerous works range from statecraft to mythological and historical dramas. Since 1927 he has been associated with the administration of the Indian States and in 1936 was elected to succeed the late Lord Birkenhead as a member of the International Diplomatic Academy of Paris. He is now the Foreign and Political Minister of Bikaner.—ED.]

The crisis through which the world is passing, the outward expression of which is the present catastrophic war, may be said to be due essentially to a failure of ideals. Whatever the other causes, one fact is clear—that in the period now coming to such a disastrous close, the intellectuals of the world—the *élite* of all countries—have been wholly ineffective in shaping the societies in which they lived, except to the extent that they subordinated their minds and faculties to the State, and thus became the instruments of other powers. This "Failure of the Clerics" to be true to their ideals of intellectual freedom and independence, and to the trust that is placed in them to serve humanity, is the great tragedy whose final scenes are now being acted in the theatres of war all over the world.

How far this subordination of the mind of the individual to the State, as embodying power, has been increasingly effective during the last four hundred years, may be seen if we consider the attitude of scientists and philosophers to their own calling. No less distinguished a scientist and thinker than Professor Bernal, in his recent book on the *Social Function of Science*, denies that there is anything which could be described as Pure Science, and holds the view that science's social function is to benefit the ruling classes of society; an extreme statement, no doubt, but one which reflects the experience of the last three hundred years, when scientists themselves have claimed to be the henchmen of the State.

The strange movement known as "Progressive Literature," which has found adherents among the young intellectuals, carries Professor Bernal's theory a stage further in the realm of creative art. According to this group, literature is not meant to reflect the ideals and aspirations of the individual, but is to be the willing handmaid of transient political fads.

No doubt, the enthusiasm of a generation may well reflect the ideals in vogue. Poets, in protest against the conditions of the interlude between the two wars, may legitimately give expression to their revolt by singing of the Spanish Revolution as an augury for a

better world, as Emile Carmmaerts, in an earlier generation, saw in the chimneys of factories a new civilisation, and sang of its glories. But *to subordinate the expression of human mind to the political needs of the time is, perhaps, the greatest betrayal that those who should be the intellectual leaders of their generation and the custodians of its future ideals can perpetrate.*

This subordination of the mind to the State is not a matter of today. The great misfortune in European history may be said to have begun when the Clerics, whose sacred duty it was to uphold the cause of humanity, began to forget their high calling and equated the welfare of the world with the greatness of the nations they served; when they claimed for each State what Hildebrand claimed for the Universal Church, the right to be considered the City of God. Father Joseph, fervently believing that the Kingdom of God in the world would be established only by the victory of France and by the greatness of the Bourbons, was the forerunner of Treitschke, who saw in the Prussian State the fulfilment of God's will, and of Lionel Curtis, who equates the *Civitas Dei* with the British Commonwealth. The American apologists, who speak of the still unfinished experiment, and the poet Yone Noguchi, who justified Japanese aggression on China as being for the benefit of humanity, and the communist hierarchs, who, while denying God, would establish His City on strictly Marxist lines, belong to the same species, intellectuals who have betrayed their trust to become the henchmen of Power.

If one of the main causes of the world's ills is this failure of the *élite* of the world to be true to their trust, in what way can we prevent its repetition and safeguard at least the future? The world that will emerge from this War, it is said, will be totally different. No doubt, there will be very great changes after the War. For one thing, the world will be poorer by the enormous destruction which the War has caused. There will be changes of political boundaries, a new set of grievances created, a new alignment of nations. But, will there be a fundamental change? Not unless the *élite* of the world unite, and decide to cast off the shackles which have bound their minds now for generations.

It is obvious that vested interests in all countries are preparing to entrench themselves, so that the world may be safe for them after the War, at least till the next Great War. While rendering lip service to the raising of the standards of the ordinary man, and to numerous kinds of freedoms to be established, the people in authority are thinking of a world in which their own groups will exercise even increased power.

In India, we have had a glimpse of the industrialists' millennium in the ten-thousand-crore scheme, an attempt to make India a replica of the Megalopolis of the New World.

In England, in spite of the Beveridge Report and the public agitation for a change in the basis of society, we have ample evidence of the desire to think in terms of more scientific exploitation of the Colonies, of an expanding export trade, of a re-establishment of industry on the old basis of competitive production for profit. The leaders of American opinion make no secret of the fact that they also think in terms of air bases circling the world, of more naval bases in the Pacific, of oil in the Middle East, not to speak of the export of capital to China and commercial penetration in India.

But, is this the kind of world that millions are fighting for? I can do no better than quote what a distinguished intellectual has said :—

The youth of the world is waiting for a new faith....They have rejected our abstract slogans and hollow institutions in which old men gibber about freedom, democracy and culture. They don't want freedom, if it means freedom to exploit their fellowmen; they don't want democracy, if it means the ridiculous bagmen of Westminster; they don't want culture, if it means the intellectual dope of our academies and our Universities. They want to get rid of the profiteers and the advertising men, the petty tyrannical bureaucrats and the screaming journalists, the clubmen and the still too numerous flock of *rentiers* for ever cackling over their threatened nest eggs. They want a world that is morally clear and socially fresh, naturally productive and æsthetically beautiful. And they know they won't get it from any of the existing political systems. They hate fascism, they recoil from communism, and they despise democracy. They are groping towards a new faith, a new order, a new world.*

It may be granted that the youth of the world is mentally restive and is in no mood to go back to the conditions prevailing before the War. But, by merely groping towards a new world, they cannot reach it. By despising democracy, or feeling disgusted with the social order based on profit and power, they will not create a New Order. *In fact, the Old Order will not vanish of itself merely as a consequence of the War, and of the miseries that have resulted from it.* The walls of Jericho did not crumble of themselves, but awaited the blast of the trumpet, and the lesson is obvious that a social order, however rotten, cannot be replaced by a better one, unless a conscious effort is made.

As we have noticed, there is no lack of effort on the part of people who have interest in the continuance of the old state of things to refashion the world much as they know it, and to erect the future structure on the same shifting and dangerous foundations. Unless an equally intensive effort is made, not merely to see that there is no return to the past, but also to ensure better and more secure foundations being laid for a morally clean and socially just future, the world that emerges from

* Herbert Read in *Politics of the Unpolitical*.

the War will not be different in its essential features.

By whom is such an effort to be made, and what should be its immediate objective? Clearly, the effort has to be by the intelligent youth of all nations. The future is for them to live in. It is their primary concern to see that there is no return to the *status quo ante bellum*. The youth of the world think alike in all countries. Their ambitions and aspirations, though expressed in different languages, are the same. Though it is they who fight and suffer the miseries of this savage war, they are the people least touched by national antagonisms. They are fighting in all countries in the hope of creating a better world, for abstract things, moved by noble instincts, without enmity or hatred. It is for them to act.

What should be the immediate objective of their effort? There can be no doubt that the first thing required is to free the mind of the intellectual leaders from its subordination to the State. The conquest of the clerics, which the State achieved, has to be undone, and that is possible only if the worship of national egoism ceases to be the accepted religion, enthroned in majesty in every country. The history of every country is an unabashed pæan of glory to national selfishness, an exaltation of every act, however treacherous and immoral, done in the furtherance of that selfishness. So long as youth is saturated with this sense of the glory of the State, there can be no freedom of the mind.

The suppression of intellectual freedom has been a very subtle process in the modern State. When one considers what enormous power and opportunity the control of education gives to the State, one is not surprised to find the regimentation of opinion which is so characteristic of the modern world. It was Fichte who discovered this new method of enforcing intellectual slavery, but it must be admitted that, since then, the principle has been extended to its logical limits equally in fascist, liberal, communist and democratic countries. With the machinery not only of the schools, but also of the radio, the cinema and the newspapers, under the control either of the State or of the classes to whom the State has come to mean power and profit, a reconquest of the freedom of the mind has become well-nigh impossible. Perhaps, at no time in world history has there been such deliberate effort to exclude "dangerous thoughts," or to shape the mind of youth in a manner suited to the classes in authority.

The liberation of the mind from bondage is, therefore, no easy task, and no mere groping towards a new ideal will help to achieve that result. What is required is that such minds as have by their own efforts liberated themselves should be banded together to form an "Alliance of the Élite" with the avowed object of preventing

at least for the future the mental slavery which Profit and Power have enforced on the world in the past. If an alliance of this nature can be brought into existence, it can give shape to the vague ideals and the uncertain gropings which characterise the mental unrest of youth, and can create out of it a new faith. Otherwise, the world will slip back, after announcing a few more "Freedoms," each succeeding one being less practicable than its predecessors, and making a spate of declarations about Permanent Peace and abolition of war as an instrument of policy.

Is such a movement possible? There is no reason to think that it is not. In spite of every effort at regimentation, there are still men and women in every country who have emancipated their minds from bondage and are able to think and work for mankind as a whole. No doubt, these are weighed down now by a sense of frustration and of helplessness. But, if an opportunity is offered, the strength which the suppressed intelligentsia will gather by their unity, will be sufficient to ensure at least a reasonable measure of success. Perhaps, the slogan for such a new movement, since the present is a time of slogans, may well be :—

Intellectuals of the World unite; you have nothing to lose but your brains.

K. M. PANIKKAR

KOREA

Liberty was in the air at the end of the last world war. Liberty and national aspirations dared to raise their voice in subjugated Korea in 1919-20 in that most moving document, the Korean Declaration of Independence. But Korea's master was then one of the "victorious" Allies; the Korean patriots' brave and confident appeal to right and justice fell upon deaf ears. The movement for freedom was put down, it is reported, ruthlessly.

Korea was promised independence at Cairo, last November, by the United States, China and Great Britain. With Japan now in the enemy camp there is ground for hope that Allied victory will really mean the restoration of Korean independence.

Public opinion is being aroused in the U. S. A. The American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, has issued a bibliography *Korea for the Koreans* which is available for 15 cents from its Office (1 East 54th Street, New York 22). The East and West Association sponsored a meeting in New York on the 16th of February to acquaint Americans with Korea's 25 million people, her contributions to culture and the dauntless spirit of her modern sons. This last no reader of their Declaration of Independence could deny. Its authors looked for protection to "the common conscience of mankind." They looked, alas, in vain. But they offered a prescription in that Declaration that the makers of the peace should bear in mind :—

> Our concern is to mend the Present,—not to weep over the sleeping past. Today it is our task to reconstruct ourselves, not to destroy others. . . in reasonableness and kindness to rectify the old mistakes with the principle of opening a new and friendly world where sympathy and justice rule.

WAR, JUSTICE AND THE BROTHERHOOD OF MAN

[**Dr. John Laird,** Regius Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen and the author of numerous philosophical works, touches here on some of the problems of international collaboration, on which world peace must ultimately rest. He sees hope, as we do, in the fact that "most human beings, and most bodies of human beings, are quite appreciably though very imperfectly idealistic." It is in cultivating their "taste for justice and for humanity" that the world's best hope lies.—ED.]

Wars are fought to obtain a settlement. They are seldom wars of extermination—although that too would be a settlement—and, for the most part, are designed to secure the co-operation of the vanquished upon the victor's terms. If there is no victor, there is a weary and wounded concordat of groups that no longer have any stomach for fighting.

Consequently there are senses in which even wars need not be wholly unbrotherly. Quarrelsome brothers may still be brothers during the struggle as well as after it. That is not a pretty aspect of brotherliness but, like most human things, need not be immedicably vile. Plainly, however, a brotherhood of fratricides is not what is usually meant by a human brotherhood. The evils of organised violence in war are so prodigious, especially if the belligerents are strong and fairly well matched, that few other evils are comparable with them. Men will be very bad brothers indeed if they do not set themselves seriously to diminish the use of violence for settling their differences.

I say to "diminish," not to "abolish." There is no likelihood that man, a fighting animal, will ever voluntarily forgo the use of violence all over the world, or that bands of resolute men will forever renounce organised violence; and a very few wolves are enough to scatter the sheep. Even a very extensive change of heart on the part of the human species will not alter these fundamental facts.

Within political communities, however, there is a device which works fairly well. In its most developed form, this device entails that the government has the monopoly of the most serious forms of violence and, having no effective competitors in this respect, succeeds in keeping the peace within its borders. Armed itself, it disarms its citizens.

In my opinion, there is little chance of world-peace unless the same device is adopted by the several political communities of the world. They must institute, and become the subjects of, a supernational world government, just as

(or much as) private men have to do in the political bodies to which they belong. Unfortunately, however, the political bodies of the present age, mostly calling themselves "nations," are not disposed to accept this device, and attempt instead to form an international league whose continuing unity is always suspect, a league, moreover, which, up to the present, has been very much less than world-wide. The least sombre of the present hopes for humanity in this kind is that some such league, unchallengeable in its power, will function as a supernational body, or do so in large measure, even if its foundations, ultimately, are very shaky indeed.

Belligerents commonly profess to have justice (as well as self-interest, determination, skill and resources) on their side, they are often sincere in this profession of "*Dieu et mon droit*" and some of their professions of righteous aims would be endorsed by an impartial spectator. During the struggle, however, they themselves are not mere spectators and are seldom impartial. The best they can claim is "Justice; but on our terms" and such a maxim, to speak mildly, has flaws in it.

In a sense, every government, having ultimate responsibility and the ultimate power of coercion, has to say something similar. There is, however, a vast difference between a belligerent government, and a government in times of peace and security. A belligerent government lives or perishes by the sword, that is, by the *drawn* sword. In time of peace a government *requires* the sword, but prefers it to be sheathed and is very unfortunate if it has often to draw the sword in order to quell civil disturbance or if it has even to rattle the sword very often for that purpose. Accordingly the professions of nearly every government in time of peace, to the effect that the main object of their rule is the welfare of the community they govern (including that inter-personal or relational welfare which is colloquially described as "a fair deal"), are likely to be better based than similar professions made during the anguish of conflict. The latter too often resemble a moral tonic invariably prescribed for the condition. The former can afford greater deliberation and closer criticism.

Even if it were invariably true that governments, in their peace-time professions, are seldom impartial and never selfless, the conditions implicit in their station would strongly suggest the advisability—to put it no higher—of the reality as well as of the show of justice, and of a genuine and effective attempt to increase the welfare of their subjects. The more they succeed in inducing the willing co-operation of their subjects the stronger they are. They have the less need for squandering their strength upon the violent domination of sullen or actively hostile subjects.

What holds intra-communally in this way would also hold of a super-communal government *vis-à-vis* the

communities which it governs. As we have seen, the best hope for humanity is either a supernational government or, failing that, an international government of the world functioning supernationally and with ample resources to keep the peace against every challenge. Such a government, just as in the case of the political government of any particular peaceful community, is more likely than any other to seek justice and promote welfare in the human world. And for the reasons already stated. It would neither be infallible nor in all senses disinterested, but it need not be unbrotherly, and even if it were selfish would be selfish in an unenlightened way if it sought its own gain at the expense of others. Moreover, most human beings, and most bodies of human beings, are quite appreciably although very imperfectly idealistic. They have a taste if not a hunger for justice and for humanity. This holds even of governments. If it be said that those who have the power will always seize the loot, the answer is that things need not happen so. If they did, the military forces in every community, since they have the power, would grab all that could be grabbed. This has sometimes happened but usually it does not happen. The soldiers, sailors and airmen may even be very poorly paid.

I have spoken of a supernational world-order on the assumption that the day of city-states or of tribal communities is past and has been replaced by an era of large political bodies often described as "nations." Such nations, if maritime, may spread themselves all over the earth but they always have at least a historical motherland, and the kernel of their nationality is always the will to unity in a political, *i. e.*, in a self-governing sense. Obviously a nation-state which expands either by land or by sea, as all sizable contemporary "nations" have done, is likely to have within its boundaries considerable bodies of people whose will or at least whose memory is opposed to such inclusion, if not actively, then sentimentally. That is bound to happen unless the expanding nation assimilates what it occupies. Such assimilation is impossible if European nations expand into Asia or into Africa, and it is very imperfect within Europe itself. Again "national" aspirations may be and are cherished by bodies of people who, whether or not they are possessed of nominal political independence, do not have the resources to be even approximately equal partners, in any effective sense, in a world-brotherhood of "nations."

Hence "justice" to nationalistic aspirations is and must remain enigmatic in its applications. "Nations" are seldom natural units. Latvia and Lebanon could not reasonably expect to be equal world partners with the United States. That would be true even if Latvia and Lebanon were internally completely united in their desire for "national" independence. In many small "na-

tions," such as Scotland or Yugoslavia, such internal unanimity does not exist. Political self-government is a function both of wishes and of capacity. Justice must give heed to both.

The relevant capacity is largely economic. To be sure, human brotherhood is not simply or chiefly a cupboard brotherhood but it would be very unbrotherly as well as very unjust to be indifferent to human standards of living, to famine, to drudgery, to squalor, in other words to neglect the economic requirements of human welfare.

When Europeans give their minds to such questions, they usually say something like this: The world has become a single economic unit. Men live by exploiting the resources of nature, and, what is more, by co-operation in this enterprise. What is imperative, therefore, is collaboration on a world scale. With such collaboration there can be comfort, mobility and even leisure for all. Without it there will be penury, stagnation and futile drudgery.

The presupposition of this view is that the requirements of the European type of industrialism dominate the entire globe. This should not be naïvely assumed. *Prima facie* it would not be unreasonable to hold that if Europeans must have tin from Malaya, the most they should ask for is permission to mine it by the sweat of their own European backs; and that the East might logically accept the benefits of European methods of sanitation and of irrigation without in addition becoming a mere cog in a vast industrial world-machine. On the other hand, co-operation is an idle vacuity if it does not imply general accommodation to the facts of the case, the said facts, in this instance, being simply human skill in transforming natural resources into serviceable commodities. Within any given community, a man who sticks to his grandfather's methods when far more efficient methods have been discovered is more of a nuisance than helpful or brotherly. The same holds of communities. No doubt, although the human brothers should unite to exploit the earth, they should not exploit one another. So far they have failed signally and notoriously to respect the latter maxim. Accommodation to new methods, however, is not, as such, exploitation, even if it is rather reluctantly secured.

Economics, however important it may be, is not co-extensive with human life, or even with good citizenship. I shall end this brief discussion with a few remarks about justice and human brotherhood with respect, firstly, to political citizenship, secondly to "life" in its widest sense.

It is sometimes held that there can be no stable world-order unless the political world pattern is faithfully copied in each particular political community. If the nations of the world united to establish a supernational world-order, such a world-order would closely resemble a

democracy. Therefore, it is said, each constituent nation should adopt a democratic order.

This consequence does not seem to follow. Certain despotic governments, it is true, certain types of militarism masquerading as politics, certain theocracies could not unite, except sullenly and dangerously, with other nations with a view to being ruled by the public opinion of the world. The exclusion of some polities on these grounds would therefore be necessary. It does not follow that all undemocratic communities should be excluded. In other words we need not hold that nations could not be good mixers in a supernational world-state unless their internal political administration were democratic.

Lastly there is much in human life which is both extra-industrial and extra-political. Indeed industry and politics, in the last analysis, are means to such wider ends. The Greeks used to ask whether the virtue of the good citizen and the virtue of the good man were one and the same. It is plain that they would not be identical, even if political arrangements were ideal. If there is anything distinctive and also valuable in the ethos of any body of men, whatever its political status and whatever its industrial efficiency, it is unbrotherly to neglect or to stifle that ethos even if its preservation hampers industry and aggravates political difficulties. Like every other claim, that is one obligation among others. It is not always paramount or ever quite untouchable. But it may be the strongest claim of all both in justice and in respect of humane brotherly charity.

JOHN LAIRD

DEMOCRACY DEFEATING ITSELF

[This plea of **Shri V. M. Inamdar, M. A.,** on behalf of the disinherited "coloured people" in the U. S. A. is timely and thought-provoking. The Negro situation in the U. S. A. is but one aspect of the larger problem of race prejudice throughout the world. The will to justice and the recognition of our common humanity offer the only hope of its solution.—ED.]

I, too, sing America
I am the darker brother
I, too, am America.

So sings the American Negro with a fervour all his own. He sings pathetically and truly. His song sums up his tragic history and voices forth the innate aspiration of a whole people. Can we not read in those lines the record of long laborious centuries of serfdom by whose sweat and toil America rose to her present civilisation? And when he claims "I, too, am America," the sufferings of generations of Negroes clamour for equality for their race.

Yet today, over seventy-five years after the formal grant of freedom, the Negro problem remains. The Negro's white brother disowns him and denies him in practice what the law of the land allows him in principle, denies him what common human feeling, above courts and codes, always and ever demands. And thus the American Negro leads today a life more or less socially disinherited for no more substantial a reason than a blind, unreasonable emotional prejudice. That is the reward which an honest and hard-working tenth of the population has got for all that it has done and does for America. The Negro works in field and factory, at all places where there is more work and little return for the worker, at all the jobs which the white man in his pride rejects in a selfish and hypocritical sense of dignity. The disability extends to every field of life, with the result that the Negro problem in America is a pathetic story of right denied and wrong enthroned with the sanction neither of law nor of reason but only of a false sense of superiority.

Today more than ever the Negroes have raised their voices in protest against injustice, along with the other suppressed peoples of the earth. Their cause has received increasing support in recent years among right-thinking people, but the war has brought the issue to a head. If people can be called upon to rise up in wrath against the Japanese, because of alleged unscrupulous cruelty and anti-white feeling, if people can be called upon to denounce Hitler and to fight Nazism because of the heresy of the Nordic master-race, there can be nothing to condone the treatment meted out to Negroes in America. It takes the wind out of the American declaration of the Four Freedoms and leaves it a slack sail, a meaningless slogan.

Thus the Negro problem has today

assumed an international aspect. Whether a people is exploited economically, politically, or otherwise, or whether it is hated because of the difference in the colour of its skin, the psychology that backs the exploitation and the prejudice is identical. Naturally, therefore, the Negro question has come to be aligned with the cause of the other oppressed nations of the world. A friendly granting of equality by the white races and their change of heart can save much future suffering but the way the democratic U. S. A. treats the Negroes and the blind alleys into which Western imperialism is driving the colonies and the dependencies tell a different tale and awaken different fears. Detroit is a danger signal for the future. And—sinister sign of the spread of the evil from the South, the former stronghold of slavery, where the Negro has been made to suffer most—Detroit is in the far North.

The discriminations and the denials, the daily hurts, insults and injustices with which the American Negro has to put up have thus become symbolical of the sufferings of a people held in bondage. Though technically free, the Negroes' life is surrounded on all sides by restrictions and barriers. Inside free democratic America there is another America which houses a sequestered and segregated tenth of the population strangled by every imaginable type of disability. In the free air of democracy the brown birds suffer a slow and regular suffocation.

It would hardly be possible to enumerate the ways in which these people suffer, for the poison has spread to every department of life. In industry as in education, in business as in finance, in civic rights as in social privilege, in legal protection as in political rights, discrimination works an utter denial not only of equality but even of the most ordinary of concessions which common decency would require. In certain parts of the country separate schools and parks and playgrounds, separate hospitals (sometimes provided by Negro initiative and effort), separate places of entertainment, separate residential areas, separate space on trains and buses are the order of the day. Neither money nor position, neither acknowledged talent nor public recognition can save the brown face from indignities. Cases are not few of the most distinguished of Negroes having had to suffer, for no fault of theirs, in most ignoble ways.

Not all America's enthusiastic appreciation of Richard Harrison's gifted histrionics could entitle him to travel through the South in anything but a Jim Crow car. The city that could shed ecstatic tears at Marian Anderson's songs would not allow her to spend a night in any "good" hotel or to be served in a "good" restaurant. The case of a Negro history scholar's having had to read the volumes he needed to consult in the men's wash-room of a public library or of the well-known author's, Richard Wright's, having

had, in order to borrow books, to impersonate a "boy" to some distinguished white gentleman are but stray instances of a sorry scheme that makes such occurrences matters of course.

That such a policy in the long run retards the progress of the nation as a whole does not prevent refusing to Negro children in many places adequate educational facilities—a factor which promotes juvenile offences and keeps down the standards of education in the whole of the land —or from keeping down wage scales for Negro workers, which kills labour initiative and business endeavour. That, in denying equality before the law to a section of the population, a rift in the whole legal machinery is being created is too readily ignored in pandering to irrational prejudice. That millions of Negroes even today are denied suffrage in practice constitutes in itself a virtual negation of democracy.

And all this against a people whose rise to a civilised awareness of life has been a remarkable sociological phenomenon of modern times! The American Negroes have achieved within eighty years what cost the white Americans centuries of groping effort. Today the Negro, through sheer dint of effort, industry and initiative can not only stand shoulder to shoulder with his white compatriot, despite restrictions on all sides, but can and does hold his own in the arts of music and entertainment. America dances to his folk tunes and wholeheartedly admires his histrionic talents. The story of Negro literature during the last seven decades is not less remarkable. The Negro's powers of endurance and his capacity for hard work have almost become proverbial. With wonderful adaptability has he gone up the rough road of modern civilisation. Placed in contact with a highly developed form of material culture —science, mechanical invention, hygiene, rapid communications and world trade—he has resurrected himself with astonishing alacrity from his erstwhile servitude. That is proof enough thrown in the face of his overbearing white companion to prove his competence to survive as an intelligent member of any modern society. That he has shown himself capable of this in the face of economic strangle-holds and social ostracism is warrant for a bright future should he be allowed a free hand. His has so far been an unfortunate tale of opportunity denied. Against the background of racial hatred and persecution his achievement gains a thousandfold.

A variety of reasons has been assigned to explain this strange complex of white behaviour. Psychologists believe that it is the expression of an aberration in the Anglo-Saxon psychological make-up which does not feel happy unless it can feel superior to someone else. To love himself the Anglo-Saxon needs to hate somebody! Economists have found the explanation in the economic submergence and educational backwardness of the Negro masses.

The historian has traced the perversity to the defeat which the landed aristocracy of the South suffered in the American Civil War. At the close of the war, some of the defeated slave-owners nursed a bitter hatred against the race they had owned in abject serfdom and the bitterness carefully handed down as a heritage has since been augmented by a false superiority complex.

An elaborate though curious philosophy of caste was evolved in justification of the treatment of the American Negro. In the days of slavery many preachers upheld the institution ; some debated if the Negro had a soul. Scientists tendered "proofs" that he was mentally and morally inferior and, to crown all, sophistry argued that since man was made in God's image and since God was not a Negro, the Negro could not be a man! Strange as all this might appear, it has the strangeness of truth, for it is a slice from almost contemporary world history. Stranger still are the explanations that continue to be offered. It is suggested—as for example in Mr. Clifford Bax's article in the March number of THE ARYAN PATH—that the Negro is by nature idle and unambitious, that only want can keep him active. It is needless to combat such an insinuation since the Negro history of the last three-quarters of a century disproves it at a stroke. To deny the Negro opportunity, position, power and responsibility and then to put him down as idle and unambitious is like denying freedom to a country and then telling it that its people are not yet ripe for freedom, without ever giving them a chance to prove their ripeness! But whether the anti-Negro feeling is a psychological complex or vengeful bitterness, there can be nothing to commend, much less to justify it. The wrong-doer has always something to say in self-justification. He never seems to care whether his hearer is convinced. His shelter is his mental arrogance and all of his attempted explanations turn out to be excuses that cannot condone the evil but only condemn him who puts them forth.

Today the Negro stands with the oppressed peoples of the world at the doors of a fretful future. Who knows how much faith he has in the war slogans of today? Naturally he is on the side of the democracies though it is at the tail-board of a democracy that he trails in the dust. Of one thing he is convinced and it is that blue-prints can usher in no sudden transformation or bring about the much-needed change of heart. The law has not helped him, inasmuch as tradition and prejudice have side-tracked law itself. He does not ask for much. He does not ask for what America cannot give. He asks for nothing more than a fair deal, nothing more than what one man can give his brother, nothing more than equality. He asks to be treated as a human being—a demand which itself is an indictment of those to whom it is addressed. He asks for liberty and peace and an

enriched life, free from want, oppression, violence, proscription, segregation. He wants, in short, democracy with the rest of his countrymen who deny him ordinary human treatment. He is convinced that the problem cannot be solved by any fiat from above but only by a fundamental change of attitude in recognition of brotherhood. If they who have toiled for centuries cannot be recognised by those for whom they have toiled, as members of a common family, nothing else can bring them together.

The suppression of the Negroes is a denial of *human* rights, morally unjust and politically retrogressive. One cannot expect the engine to run full speed with brakes on on one of the ten carriages. So there the Negroes are, this vital tenth of the American democracy, with their hopes and their aspirations, their sorrows and their sufferings. With such incongruous helotage in the heart of the Republic, American democracy defeats itself.

V. M. INAMDAR

SOLDIERS AND RELIGION

A challenge to orthodox complacency appears in *Harper's Magazine* for January 1944. Bernard Iddings Bell's open letter to the Churches "Before the Men March Home" has a message for the orthodox of other creeds as well. He quotes a chaplain as saying that if there are few atheists in shell-holes, as has been claimed, it is because these are few anywhere.

> There are a lot of new would-be magicians in shell-holes though, asking desperately only that God do miracles for their benefit in the way of deflecting deadly missiles. If you call that religion, you can have it; but if religion means for a man to give his life to God and not merely to whine for God to give more life to him, the front changes very few men.

Organised religion is no longer so attractive to the more religious of the men in the services, Mr. Bell writes. "More often than not they are a little scornful of it." The churches seem to them, in retrospect,

> smothered by respectability and enervated by timidity...controlled (and the parsons too often) by small-bore laymen fearful lest the Church blow ardently upon the latent fires of spiritual and moral revolution....Nor do they see evidence of vitality enough in the churches to enable them effectively to stand for prevention of a revengeful and dishonest peace that the politicians are preparing to unload on the world....They do not believe that the churches really love God more than money or prestige, or that they have an intention to obey Jesus Christ.

"Soft parsons, padded pews, polite piety" receive deserved derision from those who have faced realities at the front. A moral and spiritual revolution is overdue.

> If the Church has a first-rate variety of such revolution to offer, let the Church trot it out, or else forever hereafter hold a shameful peace.

WHY FAMINE IN INDIA?

[The serious and complicated character of India's economic problems is clearly brought out in this article by **Mr. John S. Hoyland.** It makes disheartening reading but the recognition of the seriousness of a disease may be a necessary first step towards a cure. That cure is certainly not beyond the power of enlightened and disinterested statesmanship, but drastic measures are required for drastic ills. Mr. Hoyland's article brings out most forcibly the dangers of further temporising.—ED.]

To those who are anxious to find out why it is that (as disclosed by a recent official report) there have been some two million famine-victims thronging the soup-kitchens in and around Calcutta who possess nothing in the world except the earthen platters on which they receive the rice-doles, it is pre-eminently necessary to read Sir Henry Maine's great book *Village Communities in East and West.* Maine was one of the most distinguished jurists who ever served the British in India. He wrote his book well over seventy years ago; but the diagnosis which it gives must be understood and taken into account if we are to comprehend what is happening to-day. He points out the extraordinary durability and survival-value of the primitive communal village, both in England and in India, and the benefits which it confers upon the population organized into such villages. The communal village had in his day been almost entirely destroyed in England by enclosing landlordism, which had appropriated the village common fields, and so had caused the rush to the new industrial cities. In India the landlordism and the individualist economy introduced by Cornwallis' Permanent Settlement in and around Bengal, and by the *raiatwari* system elsewhere, were destined to achieve the same destruction. In Maine's time this was not yet complete; but he saw perfectly clearly whither things were tending, and he gave a specially grave warning against the activities of the village moneylenders, backed by the operation of the British legal system in India.

It is to be noticed that the Indian communal village is an institution of extreme antiquity. The Greek philosopher Megasthenes, who accompanied Alexander the Great to India, speaks of these villages as "republics which are almost independent of any outside relations." Through the ages they endured, and enabled the Indian social economy to survive appalling shocks and sufferings, inflicted by invasion after invasion of savage foreigners. The villages were still in a healthy state when the British took over control of India, and were still performing numerous essential social functions, the distribution of the land in accordance with domestic need, the

communal fulfilment of agricultural duties such as the grazing of cattle, the taking in of new lands as these were needed and the guarding of crops, the communal shouldering of responsibility for the payment of taxes and the control of population-increase. The peasant knew himself to be more than a mere individual. He faced a world often bitterly hostile, strong in the membership he held in the village body-politic, and strong also in his assurance of his stake in the village lands.

When the communal village was destroyed in England in the eighteenth century, the displaced peasants had the new industrial towns to go to. The break-up of the village meant a tremendous increase in population, but this could be fed (though the adjustment of distribution took many decades) because of the new resources opened by industry. But when Cornwallis, and other members of the British governing class which had destroyed the communal village in England, proceeded—and with the best motives in the world, for they believed the communal village to be unproductive and an anachronism—to do the same in India, there was no vast growth of new industry to feed the immense population-increase inevitably released by the destruction of the village. The surplus population had to remain on the land, with the result that the new individual holdings, starting at roughly three acres of arable land per head of the population, were divided and subdivided as the generations passed until now, some hundred and fifty years later, there is little more than two-thirds of an acre per head. It is to be noticed, moreover, that as poverty has increased in this vast degree, so the generations have tended to pass more quickly, and the land therefore to be more frequently subdivided, and more heavily taxed between the periods of division; for it becomes urgent that the peasant should get his children off his hands at the first possible moment. Eleanor Rathbone's study has shown that there were some five million *more* child husbands and wives in 1931 than in 1921, in spite of the Sarda Act of the middle 'twenties which prohibited child-marriage!

Why is the destruction of the communal village, East or West, accompanied by a sudden and dangerous rise of population? The reasons are somewhat obscure, but they are certainly psychological. The peasant in the communal village, as we have said, is more than an individual. He is a responsible member of a social group, the village. He gets the help of his neighbours in many agricultural functions, which later, as an individual when the communal village has gone, he will have to perform for himself. He does not need so many children while the village endures; but when it is gone, with one minute field to be guarded from birds and deer three miles in that direction, and another two miles in that, and a third a mile over there, he needs

many children to help with the guarding. Moreover he is his own master now (except for the moneylender), and can have as many children as he likes, whereas in the old days to have more than one or two children meant outspoken criticism from neighbours who as fellow-members of the village polity would have to share the burden of their support. In England it was profitable for the new labouring class of the cities to have numerous children, because they could earn in the new factories and mines. In India it was unprofitable for the dispossessed villager to have numerous children, because it was increasingly hard to feed them from his constantly subdivided fields; but at the same time it was essential to have many of them, for otherwise those fields could never be worked. Thus, whilst in the West the murdering of the communal village meant in the long run not merely a great increase in population, but also a great growth of wealth through the new industry, in the East on the other hand the murdering of the communal village—carried through by the same governing class which accomplished that gigantic crime in the West, though for reasons of imperial efficiency rather than of personal profit—meant a great increase in population and therewith a vast growth in poverty.

The new imperial taxation, scientifically surveyed and apportioned, had to be paid by the new individualized peasantry in cash, and the cash went either through the landlord, in the *zemindari* provinces, or direct to Government in the *raiatwari* provinces. In either case, however, it had to be cash, and cash paid by the individual peasant (though indeed the communal village lingered on right up to the end of the nineteenth century in outlying districts paying the taxes in common). To get the cash the peasant must obviously sell his crops, and less obviously, but (as population increased) more and more frequently, his land or his children. Being now an individual, he must also have cash, or keep back some of his crop, to tide him over the three or four barren months when for climatic reasons he cannot work on the land. There are also more and more family festivals, often expensive, to be financed. As his holding is divided and subdivided, and his family grows larger, these things become more and more difficult. Sooner or later the point is inevitably reached at which he has to have recourse to the moneylender in order to get the cash. Once that step has been taken, it can hardly ever be retraced. It must be realized that the rural population is still, as regards the vast majority, illiterate. Being so, the peasants have no realization of what compound interest means; nor have they any means of checking the moneylender's accounts. When they go for the first loan, they deliver themselves over, helpless victims, to the tender mercies of a class whose mere existence in the

conditions under which they do exist proves them to be singularly exempt from tender mercies! As a Famine Charge Officer under Government, I myself have found moneylenders making loans at 150% per annum, and found also the starving peasantry eagerly accepting the loans on such terms. I arranged for one such case to be especially investigated by a chartered accountant, who assured me after doing so that if nothing were repaid—and it was very hard to see how, with his circumstances as they were, the peasant in question would ever be able to repay anything—the debt, which began at the equivalent of £4, would in seven and a half years amount to £4000! Interest is commonly extorted monthly, and very frequently indeed force is used for its extraction. The agents of such extortion are commonly Moslems of a peculiarly vicious class, even where the actual moneylenders are Hindus, though over large parts of India (especially Bengal) the moneylender is known generically as *Kabuli*, a word in which class-hatred, national hostility (Afghanistan has often been a bad neighbour to Hindu India) and religious animosities are concentrated. This fact must remind us that the terrible and increasing conflict between Hindus and Moslems, which so grievously threatens the future of India, is fundamentally economic in origin. It has its roots in the moneylending system.

It is not only the peasant who sooner or later goes inevitably to the moneylender. His cousin, the city mill-hand, does the same. In any time of food-scarcity there is a rush from the country to the city. Indigent people who either have no land or whose land (more commonly) is now so hopelessly subdivided as to be entirely incapable of supporting them, form the great majority of the migrants. They form an inexhaustible supply of unemployed labour in the city, whose existence incidentally depresses wages and makes organization of the workers appallingly difficult. They have heard of what seem high rates of pay in the city; but they find that they have to bribe Labour-Jobbers to get work, and have to continue to grease them suitably in order to retain it. The cost of living is far higher in the town than in the country. They have no security of any kind. They must have money, for living expenses and bribes. Too often, even if they get a job, they do not receive their first pay for seven weeks after they have started work. By that time they are hopelessly in debt to the Kabuli, who in innumerable instances seizes their whole pay as they come out of the mills on pay-day (I used to cycle daily past the gates of a great and immensely profitable mill where this happened), and merely allows them a miserable pittance of grain to keep body and soul together for the next month.

No wonder that when violence breaks out between Hindus and

Moslems, it is in these great mill cities that the worst excesses are committed against the Moslems. It must be realized also how rapidly these mill-cities are growing. In the last decennial period between the censuses Cawnpore doubled itself, Calcutta increased 85%, Jamshedpur 77%, and ten other cities over 50%. If Bombay increased only 28%, it was because it is built on a narrow island, and can only increase by going up into the air! The slum conditions in these vast new cities, with their mushroom rate of increase, baffle all description. In Bombay, for instance, recent figures declare that there are 15,000 rooms with over twenty inhabitants each! The health statistics, and especially the rates of infantile mortality, are such as might be expected under these conditions.

Those who have studied the report of the (Whitley) Royal Commission on Indian Labour and the subsequent history of the efforts after social improvement in India will realize that, in spite of the determined attempts that have been made to improve conditions, the mill-cities of India are the home of a vast system of debt-slavery which in many ways is worse than actual chattel-slavery; for under the latter system it is at least in the interest of the slaveholder to keep his slaves well fed and psychologically content, since he depends upon their labour and they are his own valuable property.

The situation in the country districts, where the great majority of the Indian people live, is similar. Once the process of indebtedness has begun, the prevailing rates of interest and the rapid growth of population make it inevitable that debts should swiftly increase. Before long the peasant finds himself compelled to take the whole of his crop, as it comes in, to the moneylender, who in innumerable cases has also become, by another inevitable process, the landowner. The peasant receives in return cash for the payment of his taxes and from time to time food for his family's consumption (he may also have clandestinely kept back some of his crop for this purpose, but moneylenders are hard to hoodwink over such things). He becomes, that is, a share-cropper of a peculiarly helpless type, for the share of the crop which he is allowed by the moneylender is a matter of the moneylender's grace, not of the peasant's right. He is a land-slave, again in a vicious system which seems to have all the vices—or almost all the vices—and none of the advantages of chattel-slavery.

Then comes some crisis (in this case the Japanese conquest of Burma) which sends food-prices rocketing. Who is to blame the moneylender if in the first place he makes his return-doles to the peasant smaller and smaller in accordance with rising prices (the peasant has normally, according to the moneylender's reckoning, an almost limitless sea of debt to be set against

such doles), and in the second place hangs on to his stocks of grain in hope of a further rise in prices? The Government fulminates, and rightly, that this is a man-made famine, and that the hoarder is responsible. So he is, though the Government does not yet recognize that the food-hoarder is the village moneylender rather than the actual cultivator. Meanwhile the famine grows, and more and more of the starving peasants leave the village in despair and flock to the nearest soup-kitchens. The famine will be broken for the time being, and is being broken, as food from outside is brought into the villages, whether by military or any other agency. But this is mere palliation. Such famine will recur, and will spread all over India, unless and until something is done to cut at the roots of the vicious land-system.

The Indian governments in the eight provinces between 1937 and 1939 showed that they had realized what is wrong. They began to put things right by limiting interest-rates, registering moneylenders, cancelling debts which had paid more than twice the principal in interest, establishing debt-conciliation boards, cancelling rent-increases and imprisonment for debt, putting an end to land-alienation to moneylenders, and above all by establishing village-councils in the attempt to recreate the communal village (lingering memories of which after all still endure in many parts of India). The history of those fruitful and strenuous years is full of hope that in the future an India free to act against the evil gnawing at her vitals may so act, courageously and wisely.

JOHN S. HOYLAND

BUDDHA'S FACE

A Face of light immobilised with love
But mobilising scattered rays of soul . . .
A mountain-poise no earthquakes ever move . . .
A drop merged in the deep beyond recall !

The soul reposes not in words nor songs,
For these can never cross the boundary
Of loneliness : no art can mend the wrongs
And greeds and wars of dark disharmony,

Nor heal with balms what lusts bring in their train,
(For Beauty, wafting echoes of Light's thrill,
Cannot redeem what life must mar or stain)
And so 'tis not to sound the soul would kneel,

But to a silence fecund with compassion,
Unique yet peopled with creative fires,
The Sleep beyond life's slumbers—stars' invasion
In phantom haunts of glittering masked desires.

Thou art a symbol of that voiceless Grace,
A living paradox no mind shall name :
In the world a call to what no world can guess,
In love a call to what no love may claim !

And yet the heart acclaims thee, thrilled, O Friend,
As a deep avatar of life and love :
Who shall appraise thy Face and will not bend
In awe to what no other face can prove ?

DILIP KUMAR ROY

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

PROCESS AND PURPOSE IN ART *

Many theories of the beautiful have been formulated in the past and, though several of them may contain elements of truth, none is altogether satisfactory. This is the reason why the æsthetic problem still remains an object of fresh research and study. There has recently been published in America a notable book which deals with most of the fundamental questions relating to it. It shows the author's wide knowledge of the literature on the subject, and also his close acquaintance with masterpieces in more than one of the fine arts. His approach to the problem is not merely æsthetic; it is also philosophical. He writes in the Preface:—

> For some years now I have hoped to understand art and beauty not merely in a way which would be consonant with my own appreciations, but also in a way which seemed to me philosophically satisfactory.

But the book is written in a much-condensed style, and a single page of it would easily "dilute" into half-a-dozen pages of an ordinary book on the subject. It consequently makes tough reading; but there is no question that a careful reader will derive from it much valuable insight into the nature of the æsthetic process—whether it be of creating beauty or of appreciating it. It is not possible, in a brief review like the present one, to do justice to its many merits. We shall therefore content ourselves with drawing attention to one important point in it, *viz.*, its view of æsthetic experience.

We shall indicate its main features best by contrasting it with what may be called the naïve view of æsthetic experience. The latter starts with an analysis of the work of art into elements which it takes to be distinctive of its beauty and describes æsthetic experience as a form of delight resulting from their contemplation. That is, æsthetic experience is assumed here to ensue upon the process of contemplating beauty. According to the present view, on the other hand, process and result together form a single whole and their separation is altogether unwarranted.

The distinction between the two views is vital. In the one case, æsthetic experience is the end to which the apprehension of beauty is the means. There is, no doubt, a causal connection between them; but otherwise they stand apart as antecedent and consequent. In the other case, that experience is conceived as a continuous process, of which means and end are but two phases. The only difference between them is that while in the first the creation or appreciation of beauty is in progress, in the second it is consummated. It is clear that, as thus conceived, means and end do not form a mere sequence, as in the other view, but are integral. In fact, the means itself is wrought up finally into the end, according to the present view. It is this unified whole of experience that constitutes æsthetic value here

* *The Æsthetic Process.* By BERTRAM MORRIS. (Northwestern University Studies in the Humanities, No. 8. Evanston, Ill. $2.25)

and not mere delight. But delight is not excluded, for that experience, as æsthetic, necessarily involves a feeling of pleasure; only here it becomes an aspect of the value instead of being identified with it. That is, we seek art not merely for the pleasure it gives, but for the unique experience it brings.

The process of contemplation again is looked upon as active in this view, and not passive as in the other. That it is so is clear from the fact that the æsthetic attitude is critical. A competent spectator will instantly notice the least fault which may mar the excellence of a work of art. Those who regard the process as passive do so because they start, as we stated earlier, with a ready-made object of beauty and naturally assume that its distinctive features, already there, have merely to be apprehended for attaining the æsthetic end. Really, however, that end can be gained only through as much striving in the appreciation of art as in its creation. It implies that all great art involves a problematic situation, and that its true significance will be revealed to none who does not insightfully follow the development of that situation until its latent tensions and conflicts are fully and satisfyingly resolved. It is to this consummatory stage that the author gives the name of "beauty." He frequently speaks of art as process, and of its product as beauty. He means thereby, if we have rightly understood him, that, like other values, the æsthetic also becomes a value only when it is realised in one's own experience.

Students of Sanskrit will recognise here a striking resemblance to a theory that has dominated art criticism in India for over a thousand years. It is not necessary to enter into its technicalities to bring out the resemblance. It will suffice to refer to the significance of the title of "*rasa* theory" which is given to it. The word *rasa* primarily means "taste" or "savour," such as sweetness; and it has, by a metaphorical extension, been applied to æsthetic experience. The point of the metaphor is that both signify a process and that the process is, in neither, sundered from the result. If we neglect the almost infinitesimal time required to excite taste when a savoury thing is placed on the tongue, the process of tasting and the satisfaction that is its result are coincident. That is to say, experience is fulfilment in the one case as in the other. The metaphor has also a deeper implication. It points to the unity of æsthetic experience, however complex it may be, as also to its uniqueness for, when two or more tastes are properly blended, it is pointed out, the result is one single taste which surpasses all of them in its flavour. The appropriateness of selecting one of the "lower" senses, rather than the "higher," to typify æsthetic experience, is in the importance of the element of feeling in art for, as psychologists tell us, that element is at a maximum in them.

But, as may be expected from the widely remote circumstances in which the two theories have been developed, the resemblance is only partial; and there are more or less important differences between them. To refer briefly to only one of these: The *rasa* theory not only points to the general importance of feeling in art, which is universally admitted; it also signifies that primary emotions (*bhāva*), like love, fear and wonder, form the subject-

matter of art *par excellence*, provided their treatment by the artist satisfies the well-known æsthetic requirements such as lifting them above the personal level. Other things also have certainly a place in art, and there is no object, according to the Indian view, which is not potentially æsthetic. But, speaking in the main, their purpose is to subserve the portrayal of emotions. In the best art of India, it is this emotional theme that is depicted. In Kalidasa's *Śākuntalam*, for example, it is love (*śṛṅgāra*); and the secret of appeal in much of Indian music lies in the fact that it embodies the longing for God of passionately devout hearts. So far as we have been able to gather, the author of the work under review does not give the same paramount place to the emotions that Indian æstheticians do.

M. HIRIYANNA

THE CONCEPT OF RIGHT *

Professor Gilson in *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* wrote that Hegel's dialectical justifications of war " are really and truly murderous ideas, and all the blood for which they are responsible has not yet been shed." And again :—

> When Fascism got the upper hand in Italy, Gentile's Hegelianism was fully justified in welcoming it in the name of Hegel's theory of the state....By saying that the state asserts its own autonomy in war, Gentile was merely repeating what we have seen to be the authentic Hegelian conception of the state.

Perhaps Professor Knox would think this exaggerated. But there can be no doubt that after the recent triumphs of totalitarianism Hegel's political philosophy has regained a topical interest and that a new and excellent translation is to be welcomed. The only complete English translation I know of, that of Professor Dyde (1896) is out of print, and I think Professor Knox does not allude to it. Dyde used the text of Gans (1833) and, like Gans, incorporated in the text certain "Additions" taken from pupils' notes of the lectures. Professor Knox has based himself on Hegel's own publication (1821) and corrections, collating these with Bolland (1902) and Lasson (1921); he has relegated the " Additions " to an appendix (73 pages) and added 78 pages of explanatory notes, without criticism.

It will be a pity if we do not take the opportunity of these scholarly labours to think over our democratic, pacific, libertarian and international ideals in the light of Hegel's grandiose totalitarianism, nationalism and militarism. But the difficulties of English readers are great. Not only is there the barbarous jargon, with its personification of abstractions like " subjectivity," (over which Professor Knox's introduction gives some help) and the hocus-pocus of the dialectic; an even greater barrier is the difference of what may be called the Prussian tone. In the country of Locke, Fox and Mill we all now pay lip-service to freedom of speech, of the press and of association; even to adult suffrage. We all admit international obligations and the

* *Hegel's Philosophy of Right.* Translated with notes by T. M. KNOX. (Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, London. 21*s*.)

wickedness, stupidity and preventability of war. And when Hegel questions or denies all this, we are apt to smile and put it down to "German docility" or "the Prussian drill-sergeant." We forget "my country, right or wrong," our imperialist assumption that we are a race chosen for the mission of carrying the white man's burden and incidentally (in Hegel's envious phrase) of "possessing the wealth and commerce of the Indies." This is the proverbial "hypocrisy of Albion"; and Hegel's hypocrisy is of a different brand. He does not try to justify nationalism and absolutism morally. In the *Philosophy of Right* and the *Philosophy of History* (translated by Sibree) he sets the national state above morality. It has a divine right, it can do no wrong. And this, in spite of Bosanquet's attempt to acclimatise it, seems to us nonsense.

I suggest that those who feel that English and Germans are just different in these matters, and that mutual understanding is impossible, should reread Burke. Burke, perhaps because he was Irish, understood the English well, and influenced their politics as much as any one before Mill. And what in him was temperamental is just what Hegel has tried to systematise and rationalise. There is the same half-cynical, half-sentimental preference of tradition to reason, the same idealisation of the constitution under which each lived. Hegel's "cunning of the Idea," (by which states grew out of men's crimes) may well be a translation of Burke's "divine tactic," for Hegel was a close student of English politics. Both share what Professor Knox calls the "theological background" ("the Concept is his philosophical equivalent for the wisdom and so for the creative power of God"). But surely it is a pantheistic, un-Christian theology, even an idolatry. God's kingdom is held to be of this world; not within us, in our minds and consciences, but in Westminster or Potsdam, and to be fully realised in eternal and inevitable progress. Whatever is, is right.

E. F. CARRITT

MORAL THEOLOGY OF TODAY *

It is my profound conviction that we are standing today at a turning-point between two civilisations, one of those turning-points in history not unlike the first or second Christian century, the Renaissance or the seventeenth century in England. The transition from an individualist to a collectivist state of society is at hand.

The quotation is from Dr. Joseph Needham's collection of Essays and Addresses covering the years 1932 to 1942. The particular essay cited is on "Land, the Levellers, and the Virtuosi" and was first printed in 1935, but this passage may have been written in later for this collection, and undoubtedly represents the author's present attitude as a Marxist and a great admirer of the writings of Friedrich Engels. Probably his Marxism would be of the greatly modified order that Marxism has assumed in the U. S. S. R. if it came to a question of prac-

* *Time: The Refreshing River.* By JOSEPH NEEDHAM. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 16*s*.)

tical politics, and, so far as it is possible to judge the trend of public opinion, he will find abundant backing when we come to the urgencies of post-war reconstruction. This shift towards the Left has, indeed, been so strongly in evidence during the last two years that even English land-owners have accepted, however reluctantly in some cases, the probability that some form of State Socialism is almost inevitable.

Having assumed that, we are naturally curious to know the kind of foundations upon which Dr. Needham's socialist state will be built, but, definite as he is in other relations, on this he seems more than a little indeterminate. In one essay he finds that "Communism and the Christian religion are... on the same side," confirming the opinion that the Archbishop of York recently expressed after his return from Russia. Against that, however, we must lay his statement that "No more shall we take Gautama and Plato for our guide, but rather those determined men who from Confucius to Marx were vehicles of the evolutionary process, working through them to implement the Promise occluded in the very beginning of our world." Finally in this connection may be added:—

> Where, then, is the moral theology of today? The only possible answer is that Communism provides the moral theology appropriate for our time. The fact that a doctrine of God is apparently absent from it is unimportant in this connection; what it does is to lay down the ideal rules for the relations between man and man, to affirm that the exploitation of one class by another is immoral, that national wars for markets are immoral [but not for other causes?]... that the private ownership of the means of production is immoral. It dares to take "the love of our neighbour" literally.

Now Dr. Needham is a man of abundant scholarship. He has read very widely and very intelligently. And what we should like to ask him in this relation is whether he can find in history any support for the belief that altered conditions have any effect upon individual morality. Is it possible, for instance, to cite a case in which such favourable circumstances as lack of oppression, freedom of thought, comparative equality of opportunity have provided "a moral theology"? Perhaps the nearest approach to an ideal system of property-holding was found among the Incas, but that was an effect and not a cause. Incidentally it seems likely that they were a declining race before they were destroyed by the horrible irruption of the Spaniards. And can we ever believe it possible that we shall "love our neighbour" at the injunction of the State? Moreover, is it not permissible to wonder why, in the U. S. S. R., the ideals of Leninism had to give place little by little to the present economic system? But Dr. Needham is primarily a scientist, and although in another essay he maintains that the scientist need not hold aloof from politics, he will inevitably carry over his principles into the social field. "The essence of science" is here defined as the "spirit of free enquiry," but the scope of that enquiry is confined within the limits of natural law, which means that it deals only with proximate and not with prime causes. And if an Utopia, some form of earthly paradise, could be achieved, mankind would degenerate to the level of the social hymenoptera. We may acknowledge the truth of Dr. Needham's conviction that we are in a state of "transition from an individualist to a collectivist state of society," but that in itself must prove a dead end, if we have no spiritual ambition other than that of serving the community. A people that can look forward no further than to physical death and is content with present ease, must decline into spiritual apathy.

J. D. BERESFORD

SOCIALISM IN THE MELTING-POT *

Bombay's Socialist Ex-Mayor might well have taken as the text of this challenging study William Morris's wise reflection which he quotes in the course of it :—

> I pondered all these things and how men fight and lose the battle, and the thing they fought for comes about in spite of their defeat, and when it comes about it turns out not to be what they meant, and other men have to fight for what they meant under another name.

The upward progress of the race as of the individual is a series of progressive awakenings, each advance bringing with it the assurance that now, at last, the goal is within reach. Sooner or later it is found that the light towards which we had hastened was but a clearing in the forest, and not the edge of the woods as we had dreamed. Such are the implications of this honest stock-taking of socialist theories in the light of recent experience.

Mr. Masani shows how disappointing is the record of Social Democracy in England, France and Germany, with its weak betrayal of its opportunities. But the shadow that inexorably follows all human innovations lies darkest where the light of hope was brightest. Many saw in the great Russian experiment the promise of a world redeemed. It held indeed stupendous possibilities. It is not strange that socially sensitive men hailed it with an enthusiasm matched only by the bitterness and fear that it aroused in most upholders of the *status quo*. As Russia has swung ever nearer to the sorry norm, the bitterness and fear have died, but with them also died the hopes the great experiment had inspired.

Economic inequalities have grown; complete regimentation is maintained by espionage and violence; and a narrow nationalism with imperialist leanings has replaced the former international ideal. Despite spectacular achievements, Russia today is "neither *classless* nor *democratic* nor *international*," hence not socialist at all, but a "Managerial State." Mr. Masani is forced to the conclusion that nationalisation of industry leads only to a different form of exploitation if unaccompanied by political democracy.

Individual liberty also calls for special safeguards under a collectivised economy. It is over individual rights, Mr. Masani believes, that the hardest battles of the next fifty years are likely to be fought. "Who owns the State?" he recognises as "the question of questions."

If in "A False Dawn," the first of the two essays published in this book, Mr. Masani faces facts not easy for a former enthusiast to proclaim, the second essay, "A New Day," offers the reassurance that the ideal of social and economic justice has survived the shipwreck of the form. The hope of early victory has given place to a disinterested altruism. Mr. Masani writes :—

> To struggle for larger social aims, whether they are achievable in our own lifetime or not, is part of an evolved conception of living.

It is high time the Marxist assumption was challenged that "socialism can be realised by appealing to the

* *Socialism Reconsidered*. By M. R. Masani. (Padma Publications, Ltd., Sir Phirozeshah Mehta Road, Bombay. Re. 1/-)

collective selfishness of the working class and its collective hatred for the property-owning classes." Mr. Masani demands:—

Can one ever get to a superior society based on co-operation and love by appealing to selfishness and hatred?

The methods of achieving socialism, he insists, should fit the end.

This calls for a repudiation of the Communist slogan that "the end justifies the means."...Socialism can only be achieved by clean means and with clean hands.

The tools so far employed to realise the socialist ideal have proven their inadequacy except in the small, genuinely democratic Scandinavian countries, where, Mr. Masani concedes, further progress may perhaps be left with safety to the constitutional methods of the Social Democrats. Still, to capitulate either to old-type capitalism with its muddle, anarchy and waste or to totalitarianism would be, he recognises, "for the human spirit to accept defeat." He turns therefore to the search for better tools and therein makes his most constructive contribution.

The failure of the Communist experiment has roused a question whether the intelligence of the common man is equal to controlling a highly organised industrial State machine, or, as Mr. G. D. H. Cole put it a couple of years ago, to "maintaining effective democracy in any unit larger than a parish or urban district council." Mr. Masani believes it

far more likely that a decentralised system of industry on a co-operative basis will result in the "free and equal society" of Lenin's dreams than a highly collectivised system of concentrated industry with its attendant dangers of bureaucracy and of totalitarian dictatorship.

He pins his hopes to "smaller territorial units of administration where there is less scope for regimentation and more for free co-operation." Such a decentralised economy is the ideal of Gandhiji, some of whose contributions to political thinking Mr. Masani commends to the study of socialists desiring to enrich their armoury. One of these is the weapon of mass civil resistance, clean and non-violent, which Mr. Masani finds particularly suited to a country "where the ballot box is not available and where bullets must be eschewed."

The socialist has long argued that real democracy is impossible without socialism. Now Gandhiji points out that neither democracy nor socialism is possible in any but a non-violent society.

Gandhiji's trusteeship of wealth commends itself to Mr. Masani as a transition to a socialist society.

The socialist objective still remains that of "a free, democratic, classless and international society, where the ruling principle will be: 'From each according to his capacity, to each according to his needs.'" But if the failures of the last twenty-five years have taught any lesson in regard to means it is the necessity of the open mind, the fact that "dogmatism in respect of the institutional bases of society should give place to a willingness to experiment." And "failure," after all, as Henry Ford once wrote, "is only the opportunity to begin intelligently again."

This is a very valuable little book.

E. M. Hough

WARNING FROM ASIA *

Dr. Shridharani, a young Indian living in the United States, has already made a name for himself as an intelligent and energetic interpreter of his country. Both his earlier books, *War Without Violence*, an interpretation of the Gandhian philosophy of non-violence, and *My India, My America*—part autobiography and part political information—have been well-received by the American critics and public alike.

Warning to the West is a more topical, though by no means a superficial, essay. Addressed mainly to the people of Britain and America, it is a restatement of the case of the East against the West, dealt with not merely on a political plane, but against the background of deeper psychological and philosophical conflicts. Therein lies the value of this book, which is not only readable but thought-provoking.

Armed with an incisive analytical mind and an impressive array of facts, Shridharani traces the whole history of East-West relationship—the reopening of Japan to the West by Perry, the Western inroads in China, British rule in India, the ways of the white sahibs, "Missionaries: the Strange Allies of Imperialism," racial affronts from America, down to the fall of Singapore.

The whole of Asia has felt the irresistible pressure of western civilization. West arrived as a conqueror and, in doing so, inflicted a deep and grievous injury on the collective consciousness of Asia. The story that follows is a saga of West's victories in the East, and also of that reawakened Asia which is determined to drive out the western conqueror while it continues to cherish the western friend.

He pleads, therefore, not for superficial political concessions to the East.

Political action dictated by the exigencies of war will solve only a surface problem. A deeper conflict will remain which may disturb the peace, after it comes, or create another war when this one is over.

He warns that the centuries of bitterness and hostility between the East and the West can be changed into friendship by "nothing less than a revolution in the insular psychology of the western man." And yet his attitude is one of friendship to the Anglo-Saxon—"because I share with him a common cause"—and he quotes Buddha with telling effect: "Only a friend warns; the enemy strikes."

It is an admirable book and a distinct contribution to creating a better understanding between the East and the West. The correspondence between Tagore and Noguchi that is quoted in full and a devastating comparison between Cripps's views of 1939 and 1942 are used to good purpose. But Shridharani's thesis is weakened by two serious omissions. He makes no mention of the men and women of good-will—people like C. F. Andrews and the Rev. Mr. Sunderland, for instance—who, though born in the West, did cross over the racial barrier and extended the hand of friendship to the East. They might have been only a few individual idealists, but they did prove the possibility of breaking down the wall of prejudice between

* *Warning to the West.* By KRISHNALAL SHRIDHARANI. (Duell, Sloan and Pearce, New York, and International Book House, Ltd., Bombay. Rs. 4/14)

the East and the West. Then, again, he fails (or is reluctant) to estimate the effect of the world-wide socialist movement and the establishment of the U. S. S. R. on East-West relations. After all, millions of Communists, Socialists, Anarchists and other radicals have not only accepted but openly advocated freedom, equality and the ending of colonial exploitation as the only basis for a new world order. The problems of colour, of race, of Asia *versus* Europe, of East *versus* West, *have* been successfully solved in the Soviet Union, and not to take this fact into consideration gives a rather distorted picture of the situation against a world background.

Finally, one might mention that it is rather naïve of Dr. Shridharani to view a global war (in which the Chinese, the different nationalities of the U.S.S.R., the Slavs, the Free French, the anti-Fascist Italians, the anti-Nazi Germans, the Abyssinians, are all on one side) purely in terms of the Anglo-Saxon powers fighting the Huns and the Japs. The issues of war, inevitably linked as they are with ideological and class conflicts, have already cut across racial lines and it is well to recognize this fact as a basis for the reorientation of East-West relations.

K. A. ABBAS

Comedy in Chains: A Novel of South India (1939-1941). By DENNIS GRAY STOLL. (Victor Gallancz, Ltd., London. *7s. 6d.*)

One usually takes up a novel about India by a non-Indian writer with considerable prepossession if not actual suspicion. The Anglo-Indian literary tradition is responsible for that. But it does not take very long to realise that Mr. Stoll's sympathies move in the right direction and draw him to that small group of distinguished writers about India—Forster, Thompson and a few others—who have put their finger on the right point of throbbing life. It is probably possible, in the matter of detail, to quarrel with Mr. Stoll, but the perspective of his general approach to this story of a South Indian temple-girl in contact with a Eurasian doctor, is so profoundly correct that the reader hardly feels inclined to complain. Mr. Stoll must be quoted to be understood:—

> I've been about this country more than most, and I know that laws and armies aren't all that Indians think about. They don't seem so impressed with the forensic and military mind as they once were. Young India's highest aspiration is no longer to be a barrister or a subaltern. The novelty has worn off the law and the army. More Indians than we imagine are able to see beyond ordering and killing....

It is an English District Collector speaking to a hard-headed magistrate who believes in suppression. The Collector, unlike most of his kind, is open-minded.

> Now our people here talk democracy in a pigeon-tongue, partly Victorian, partly cast-off Yankee *cliches*. We fail to express ourselves in living terms that convince American and Indian democrats of our integrity. We clutter our declarations up with too many elderly phrases. Dominion Status, for instance, is anathema to Indians. It falls on their ears as a curse from devils. And yet we go on declaring it as our intention, promising it to Indians at some vague mystic date as though it were a will o' the wisp that they were after. They gave up chasing it years ago. To-day for them it is full democratic freedom or nothing....

That is Mr. Stoll, who gives us besides a number of characters we cannot soon forget.

V. M. INAMDAR

The Starlit Dome. By G. Wilson Knight. (Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, London. 16*s.*)

Mr. Wilson Knight quotes these words from Keats on the moon:—

> Thou dost bless everywhere, with silver lip
> Kissing dead things to life

and makes the following commentary:—

> See what a lot is there condensed: the mysterious levelling alteration irrespective of objects that moonlight performs; its strange ability to create a sacred and romantic glamour, rendering the inanimate mysteriously significant and vital; the use of kissing to saturate the statement with specifically romantic and erotic feeling; personification in "lip"; and concrete, sculptural weight in "silver." Keats loves the sculptural and also chariots, like Milton and the earliest and latest Shelley.

And concerning Keats's dictum—"Beauty is truth, truth beauty, that is all ye know...." Mr. Knight explains the meaning in this way:—

> The fusion of the spatial and temporal which conditions what we call "beauty" is a penetration of essential being and therefore identical with "truth."

I choose the above quotations because they are of convenient length; but it would be more than easy to find similar commentary on almost any page of this long volume devoted to a study of Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley and Keats.

There is nothing wrong or preposterous about these remarks. They are merely perfectly useless. It is true enough to say that those lines by Keats contain the numerated properties. But you could go on like that for ever about any two lines of poetry. Nothing is gained by putting good poetry into bad prose. And bad prose this is, terribly ugly, and dead as a door-nail. The whole book is written with the same complete absence of style. For lack of a better word we might call it professorese. This strange language consists in taking to pieces the living word and displaying the pieces to us with the assumption that this is Criticism. Or saying that one poet's passage is like another poet's passage: a habit in which Professor Knight surpasses himself, reaching the following sublime instance:—

> Moneta's eyes are strikingly described, visionless of "external things," seeing inwards into the depths of human personality. The blindness of Shirin in my own (unpublished) novel, *The Shadow of God*, is directly analogous.

The commentary concerning the meaning of Keats's famous dictum is all right if we happen to know the meaning beforehand. Keats meant that to be able to *see* Beauty is to be saved, that recognition *is* salvation; for Beauty by itself *creates* faith and answers our question. But who would have guessed this from Mr. Knight's remark!

Searching desperately for a *line* in his essay on Wordsworth I came on this which (for a moment) seemed to be saying something:—

> Wordsworth would isolate the poetic essence for awed inspection instead of using it. The cause lies in some rejection of the erotic instinct: for it is that instinct, and that alone, which seems to bar mankind from the full natural integration, of which it also, paradoxically, prompts the desire. Man's most obviously natural instinct is thus at once the main obstruction and highway to a naturalistic paradise. The confusion is tantalizing.

It is indeed.

At the conclusion of his study Mr. Knight says that all he hopes to do is to clear the ground for intelligent reading and rereading. It is the poets' or rather the poems' business to create the necessary experience. That is what poetry is for. But

this it cannot do whilst we remain impervious to its method.

It is impossible to squeeze any sense out of that last sentence: it could be made to mean anything or nothing. I can only conclude by saying that I have not tried to conceal my hostility to this book because I am perfectly certain that *its* method is the most harmful to the cause of poetry and the most likely to promote the worst form of unintelligent reading.

JOHN STEWART COLLIS

The Russian Horizon. An Anthology. Compiled by N. GANGULEE, with a Foreword by H. G. WELLS. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

It is more difficult now perhaps than ever to know the truth about Russia. Even Mr. Wells, who believes in scientific Utopias, qualifies the admiration and affection for Russia which he expresses in his Foreword to this volume with some downright criticism of the Communist Party. Much, too, of the unrestrained eulogy of Russia at present in fashion is dictated by war-fever and is even voiced by men who, until the war made it overwhelmingly expedient to declare otherwise, had denounced the Russian Social experiment as Satanic. What then are we to think? And does this anthology of passages from Russian writers from Pushkin to Mayakovsky and from foreign sympathisers, too, make it easier to decide? A little, perhaps, but not much. At the Pushkin Celebrations Dostoevsky said, "Our poor country will be the one which will give humanity a new word." And again Father Zossima in *The Brothers Karamazov* declared "Our people will shine forth in the world, and all men will say: 'The stone which the builders rejected has become the head stone of the corner.'" Fifty years later Frans Maseval in a *Message to the Communist Party* remarked,

I think that today all men of good faith who have sufficient information about the Soviet Union must agree that it is in the U. S. S. R. that the social régime is being built which will assure to man a life more worthy, more human, more just: a life that will no longer permit the exploitation of man by man.

Certainly no man of good-will could do anything but hope that this may be so. But Father Zossima, I fancy, if he could see how his prophecy is working out might have considerable doubts. So indeed might Tolstoy who wrote in his Diary that "an economic Revolution not only may, but *must* come in Russia," but who also insisted that a revolution by violence could only in time result in the re-establishment of autocracy and servitude under another form. Such quotations from Tolstoy do not, of course, appear in this anthology. He may, too, have been wrong, though the course of the Russian revolution to the present day has not yet convincingly refuted him.

For many who believe that the success or failure of all experiments in living, social or individual, depends on the truth of the view of man's relation to the universe underlying them, the dialectical materialism upon which the Russian revolution has been based must seem a dubious and one-sided foundation. It has meant, for one thing, an uncritical surrender to the

machine processes which profit-seeking industrialism had elsewhere developed with so little concern for the men and women enslaved by them. Under the stresses of war, too, signs that revolutionary Russia was turning into a National State, not very different except in economic organisation from other powerful National States, have multiplied. This has been a great comfort to reactionary governments which can now point to the consecrating hand of the Greek Orthodox Church once more blessing the violence no longer directed against itself. *Plus ça change*, it might seem. But this anthology does move one to withhold that disillusioned verdict. The real revolution in the hearts and minds of men has yet to come. But in the Russian Soul as it shines through many of these excerpts there is something that inspires faith in Dostoevsky's prophecy. What they have done is a beginning of which it is impossible to foresee the end.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

The Wisdom of the Overself. By PAUL BRUNTON, PH. D. (E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., New York. $3.75)

This latest work of Dr. Paul Brunton is claimed to contain "the pith and essence of all the known and secret wisdom of the thinkers of the East concerning the Overself." The skill and care lavished by the publishers on the production of the book would almost seem to indicate that they believed the claim!

In sixteen chapters covering more than 450 closely printed pages, we are given an exposition of the chief ideas and principles of the Advaita system of our philosophy, but undergoing a change which is neither rich nor strange. The language of the book has the appearance of extreme scientific precision, because of a miscellaneous use of many modern terms derived from recent advances in psycho-analysis. But there is far too much of padding, of repetition, and a labouring of the obvious which might perhaps be gratefully welcome to those who are unacquainted with the outlines of Hindu thought. Thus, in the first fifty pages, we have an otiose explanation of the supremacy of a Cosmic Law of Karma which is summed up in a single Sanskrit quatrain, *viz.*, the nāndi slōka of Bhartrihari, the author of the *Satakās*.

Other curious features of the book are an amiable timidity which seeks to equate everything to everything else. Thus, all the religions of the world are passed in review, and each is praised for enunciating some principle or other which on examination is found to be not peculiar to itself alone. Though the Advaitic principle is emphasised from beginning to end, the author finds Dualism of all kinds equally satisfying. The Hindu concept of the perpetual flux between Purusha and Prakriti is stretched out to explain the problem of Evil in the world and how to overcome it. Even the Christian ideas of Grace and Salvation repose undisturbed by the side of the Hindu ideas of Siddhi and Mukti. Above all, frequent but vague references are made to a host of anonymous Asiatic and Oriental thinkers, and equally anonymous secret books, to enforce either obvious truths or truths for which there are definite authorities with us. In this way, many significant texts from our śrutis

as well as their classic interpretations by our Acharyas are quietly paraphrased in the author's own language. The impression is sedulously cultivated that the corpus or canon of Hindu thought is really of extra-Indian provenance. One feels too that the author must have read Sri Aurobindo's two volumes on the Divine Life. But there is no reference at all to him anywhere in the book.

The value of the book, particularly to Western readers, should lie, we think, in the methodical attempt to trace the links between the three states of consciousness, more tersely summed up in one of our own Upanishads. The author's concept of the Overself is our own idea of Brahman conceived of in its *nirguna* stage. But he coins a new term "Mentalism"—neither elegant nor adequate, we think—to account for all the phenomena of consciousness. More refined subdivisions of them are conveyed by our terms Chit, Jnana, and Buddhi.

In the final chapters, we have a series of hints on the practice of certain kinds of psycho-spiritual exercises which, in our tradition, are understood to be of full efficacy only when practised under the eye of a competent guru.

P. MAHADEVAN

Uṣāniruddha. A Prakrit Poem in Four Cantos. By RAMAPANIVADA; edited by PANDIT S. SUBRAMANYA SASTRI and DR. C. K. RAJA. (Adyar Library Series No. 42, Adyar, Madras. Rs. 3/8)

The Adyar Library, Madras, has contributed in no small way to the study of the best thought enshrined in Sanskrit, the language of the Gods, by the publication of numerous volumes pertaining to different branches of Sanskrit learning. It is, however, for the first time that a Prakrit work has been included in their valuable Series. The first canto deals with Uṣā's dream, Aniruddha's presence at the residence of Uṣā, its detection by her father Bāṇa, followed by Aniruddha's imprisonment, leading to Uṣā's grief. In the second canto the poet shows that Srī Kṛṣṇa, knowing the fate of his grandson Aniruddha, proceeds against Bāṇa. A battle ensues and Bāṇa's general is defeated. He capitulates and praises Srī Kṛṣṇa. In the third canto Bāṇa is shown as defeated, though he was helped by Siva. Bāṇa then praises Kṛṣṇa and gives his daughter Uṣā in marriage to Aniruddha. Kṛṣṇa then returns to his city, Dvārāvatī. The fourth canto ends in jubilation at Dvārāvatī and the subsequent honeymoon of the wedded couple.

Rāmapāṇivāda was a great scholar and poet at the courts of many kings in Malabar, including Ārya Srīkaṇṭha Rāma Varma of Dr. Raja's family and King Mārtaṇḍa Varma of Trivandrum, who died in 1757-58 A.D. It is clear, therefore, that this poet flourished in the second and third quarters of the eighteenth century. Attempts have been made to identify him with a Malayalam poet Kuñcan Nambiar. In his scholarly introduction Dr. Raja refutes these attempts and concludes that Rāmapāṇivāda and Kuñcan are two distinct authors.

It is unfortunate that Pandit S. Subramanya Sastri, who completed the major part of the edition before leaving us, has not lived to see its completion. The edition is based on a palm-leaf

manuscript and also on a transcript in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. Without critical editions of Prakrit texts on the lines of the present edition no comprehensive history of Prakrit literature can be written. We have great pleasure, therefore, in welcoming the present edition and trust that the authorities of the Adyar Library will add many such editions to their illustrious Series before long.

Among scholars who have been engaged in bringing out critical editions of Prakrit texts side by side with their work on Sanskrit texts, mention must be made here of Dr. A. N. Upadhya of Kolhapur, who printed the text of this poem in 1941 in the *Journal of the Bombay University* (Vol. X). He has already edited critically certain Prakrit poems such as the *Kaṁsavaho* of Rāmapāṇivāda (1940), the *Soricaritta* (1943) and others based on manuscripts discovered in the extreme South. From these works we get a fair idea of the form and tendencies of literary Prakrits as evolved in the closing period of their career and cultivated in the areas where the Dravidian languages are spoken. We hope, therefore, that Dr. Raja and his collaborators at the Adyar Library will leave no stone unturned in discovering rare Prakrit works from the South and will publish them in the valuable Adyar Library Series in the manner of the critical edition of *Uṣāniruddha*, which leaves nothing to be desired in the matter of careful editing and neat printing, features common to the other publications of the Series brought out from 1910 onwards.

P. K. GODE

The Yoga of Sri Aurobindo. Part Two. By NOLINI KANTA GUPTA. (Author, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry. Re. 1/4)

Showing evolution, as the ancients did, as the return movement of an involutionary process, Sri Aurobindo's cosmic process is an awe-inspiring sweep of Consciousness downward into Matter and back again. It offers the corrective to the physicist's profoundly pessimistic dogma of irreversibility and entropy in Nature's processes. It claims a complementary upward drive of Nature, re-energisation and reintegration, more than counterbalancing the katabolic process.

Shri Gupta explains that the Consciousness latent, imprisoned in Matter, struggles to express itself and what we call Life results in the plant world; struggles again and a rudimentary animal psyche appears, "asks for a still more free and clear articulation" and self-conscious man appears upon the scene. And the higher reaches of consciousness beckon still. At each stage, when the lower level reaches a certain development, the next higher descends to lift it up, *e. g.*, "Life cannot produce Mind...unless it is seized on by Mind itself."

The concession of personality to the supreme Reality is a weakness in a system which has much of logic and of high idealism to commend it.

E. M. H.

Redeeming the Time. By JACQUES MARITAIN, translated by HARRY LORIN BINSSE. (Geoffrey Bles, The Centenary Press, London. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

M. Jacques Maritain is a thinker who commands the respect even of readers least able to share his assumptions and conclusions. Maritain believes, thinks and pleads as a loyal Roman Catholic and as a formidable proponent of the neo-Thomist philosophy deriving from the philosopher-saint, Thomas Aquinas. Constantly he guards himself —and the Church which stands behind him—against any possible misunderstanding his tolerance might evoke; but of that tolerance, prescriptive though it be, this volume is ample proof. Indeed he stretches Roman Catholic comprehensiveness and goodwill to the uttermost, as a faithful son of Mother Church who nevertheless finds in "the mystery of persons and of the divine presence within them" a sufficient ground for fellowship among men of differing creeds. Each must be true to the light that is within him, a light which may not be evaded. *Rapprochement* can come, he asserts, not through the straining of fidelity, nor through some easy syncretism uniting all forms of faith and worship in some "World's Fair Temple," but through mutual love in God and for God. A certain *community* of doctrine there must be but *identity* of doctrine, however ultimately desirable, there need not be.

Maritain looks for a fellowship of believers, not of beliefs, a fellowship of men who engage in common action for the upliftment of the world on the basis of brotherly love. In this connection he quotes approvingly some words of Gandhiji concerning the necessity of the law of the family in national and international affairs, and adds this, his own solemn warning:—

> If those very men who wear the insignia of the spirit allow their souls to become subject to those forces of destruction which desperately set evil against evil, and if they enlist religion—even, as some may say, in its own interest—in any undertaking whatever of domination and violence, I think that the disaster for civilisation will be irreparable. What is required of believers at the outset and before everything else, even in the struggles of this world, with all the harsh means they imply, is not to dominate but to serve. It is to preserve among men confidence in good-will, in the spirit of co-operation, in justice, in goodness, in pity for the weak and the outcast, in human dignity and in the power of truth.

The chapter entitled "Who Is My Neighbour?" from which this quotation is taken, is worthy of study as a definitive statement of the Catholic attitude—stretched as far as it can go—to intercredal *rapprochement.* The Catholic Church is in itself and in its own fashion, as Maritain notes in his chapter on Human Equality, a guarantor of the essential equality of mankind while recognising the inequalities that are consubstantial with social life. In October 1939, after the outbreak of war, "the Pope consecrated over the tomb of Saint Peter twelve bishops belonging to the most diverse peoples, several of whom were men of colour." In this respect at least, and as a consequence of its sacramental doctrine, the Roman Catholic Church offers an example of enlightenment to Protestants in the United States and South Africa (perhaps elsewhere also) whose worship to be pure must also be white!

No less iniquitous is racial discrimination as between Gentiles and Jews. In a chapter on "The Mystery of Israel," Maritain reveals his distress,

a distress every rational man shares, at the nightmare of anti-Semitism, but his interpretation of Israel's history as the betrayal of her mission as a chosen people will commend itself only to those who share his dogmatic presuppositions. Israel's task today, he says, is to leaven the world, to exasperate it and prevent it from sleeping. Significantly, the passion of Israel has the form of the Cross.

Woven into the Thomist pattern of the book are chapters on "The Political Ideas of Pascal," "The Sign and the Symbol," "The Natural Mystical Experience and the Void" and a critical appreciation of the philosophy of Henri Bergson who, despite his metaphysic of Duration, drew closer to Roman Catholicism in his later years. That the book is tough reading in parts is probably no discredit to the competent translator.

LESLIE BELTON

The Nature of Self. By A. C. MUKERJI. 2nd Edition. (Indian Press, Ltd., Allahabad. Rs. 7/8)

The author seeks a new solution to the "Problem of Self." The work is characterised by him as "some sort of logical envisagement in the light of modern thought, of Sankara's theory of Self." He also claims to have developed Sankara's analysis of experience in independent new directions.

The author deplores Deussen's interpretation of Sankara and challenges the raising of Sankara to a position of infallibility as an exponent of the theory of Self. It is not the Self commonly known as *Atman* or *soul*, but Self as consciousness or knowledge, that raises the problem. The author traces all puzzles regarding the self to the ambiguous use of the terms consciousness and knowledge and declares that

> the prospects of a satisfactory solution of this supreme problem are therefore likely to be brighter if we start with the notion of consciousness rather than that of self.

Throughout, the arguments revolve round "the ultimate presupposition of knowledge." The answer also repeats itself—It is consciousness as foundational, immediate, unobjectifiable, immanent and absolute. The author attacks Western idealistic theories on the one hand and psychological and naturalistic theories on the other.

The main argument seems to be that Consciousness as the central Ego, the Subject and the Knower, cannot be brought under any categories or objects of Knowledge.

Western Idealists and Absolutists are shown in their twofold anxiety, to reduce the Self either to a mere abstraction—that it may transcend the categories of knowledge—or to a reality conditioned by a subject-object correlativity—that it may be defined. But Kant is also said to have upheld an agnostic theory, whereas Green and others arrive at modified agnosticism. Still one interpretation of Kant exactly corresponds to advaitic theory. The analysis of consciousness by Kant and Green is said to be "essentially an illuminating commentary to Sankara's theory of Perception."

In spite of Bradley's Self's being an appearance, both he in his "immediate Experience" and Hegel in his "concrete Universal" reflect Sankara's theory of Self. The author is consoled

in so far as they all fit into Sankara's scheme. He happily remarks :—

> The development of categories from Aristotle to Kant and Hegel is but an illuminatory exposition of the advaita position.

All the other theories that make the Self a substance, an attribute, an agent, a circle of relations, an unconscious Unity etc., are shipwrecked on the rock of materialism involving agnosticism. Buddhistic theory as revealed by Nagarjuna and Vasubandhu is observed to be purely negative or nihilistic, the doctrine of momentary consciousness leading to that of no-Soul. The author refuses to see the positive side of Buddha's teachings. Hume's and James's stands are believed to be the Western parallels to the Buddhistic position. Ramanuja is said to have thrown "logic to the winds" in order to save "his religious predilections." The author does not care to show the position of Dwaita, though it is one important system of Vedanta.

The author seems to surmount every difficulty by avoiding the triple division of Knower, Knowledge and the object known and by seeing both Knower and Knowledge in one and the same principle, *i.e.*, foundational consciousness. The metaphor of light which illumines both itself and the objects, is the only explanation. The Self like light both knows and is known simultaneously. The method of dialectic is only helpful but not complete in itself. What can at best be a *presupposition* cannot be a reasoned-out proof. The author himself remarks that

> some sort of agnosticism must be a *necessary* accompaniment of every theory of self.

So the problem of Self must ever remain, as it is characterised in the Preface, "one of the most baffling and slippery problems of philosophy," unless it takes its final stand on Revelation and not Reason.

Though the book abounds in repetition and fails to do full justice to some great philosophers, it is thought-provoking and interesting to students of metaphysics.

C. SETU BAI

Angry Dust. By MANJERI S. ISVARAN. (Shakti Karyalayam, 261, China Bazar Road, Madras. Rs. 2/-)

These nine stories move briskly. Excepting perhaps the long story, "Consummation," which verges on the morbid, they afford vivid glimpses into common life, into poverty, jealousy, superstition, the waywardness of "legal" justice and the unhappiness of man's own making. The author's sure eye for the dramatic could have been used to wonderful advantage if supported by restrained handling of the situations. These seem a trifle overdone. The reader who has definitely been put in a responsive mood is disillusioned to find that what could have been left to his imagination has all been concretised. But this apart, Shri Isvaran can tell a story and tell it well. His scenes are always vivid and his characters, though we meet them only in definite contexts, always authentic. These vignettes from contemporary life are evidence of a sensitive and observant approach to life.

V. M. I.

Religion, Science and Society in the Modern World. By A. D. LINDSAY. (Oxford University Press, London. 3s. 6*d*.)

The conception that science will go on indefinitely making discovery after discovery seems to Dr. Lindsay to run parallel with the idea of progress to infinite perfection as understood in Christianity.

In the East, before agreeing to such an interpretation of science as apart from religion, although in the West they are still divided, it would be necessary to analyse the meaning of science by a process of intellectual and spiritual discrimination.

It is in the ancient Sanscrit teachings alone that we find religion and philosophy advancing hand in hand, each the complement of the other. Science, taking the form of uncovering the hidden in consciousness rather than that of discovering something new, is thus more truly in line with education, which suggests a drawing forth of that which is already innate but unrecognized as such.

"What does the conception of modern science infer?" Dr. Lindsay asks. "It assumes, that the most precious things of life will not stay put." Apart from modern science, surely history reveals this fact of relativity very clearly. Relativity is not new to India. It is really "Maya." The dualism of the Absolute and the relative is the starting-point of all the Hindu paths of philosophy, as well as the bone of contention between dualistic, qualified non-dualistic, and monistic systems, represented by Dvaita, Advaita Vedanta and the Yoga paths of attainment to unity with Brahman (Absolute Existence, Beauty and Truth as essence without qualities).

These pages actually review the subjects mentioned in the title of the book, which covers the philosophies, sciences and ideals for which the Renaissance and the Reformation stood.

Was Hobbes right in his interpretation of the new sciences that made their appearance in the seventeenth century? According to Hobbes, "Men remain the limited selfish animals they started." There is no advance, no coming to perfection as the Church teaches. "Physics," Hobbes thought, "must be applied to politics." Other contemporary physicists held the same ideas and the Greek distinction between the Absolute and relative worlds was broken down.

Kant's conception of modern science led to nineteenth-century Germany's ideal of a free university. "Scientists," Dr. Lindsay says, speaking of the second half of the nineteenth century,

> acted all over the world as though the free pursuit of truth, was a task which reduced differences of nationality, colour, and class to nought. The university became more an organ of research than of teaching.

Yet when the testing time came the German universities offered practically no resistance to the forces which attacked that ideal.

Despite all differences between American and English democracy, they share the fundamental view that the State is only an instrument to serve society. Dr. Lindsay concludes:—

> The precious values of the community must be free. The rôle of the State is to preserve that freedom, not destroy it or dominate society.

L. E. PARKER

CORRESPONDENCE

"THE TELL-TALE PICTURE GALLERY"

May an appreciative reader of the collection of "Occult Stories" by H. P. Blavatsky and W. Q. Judge, which recently appeared under the above title, take issue with Mr. Banning Richardson on a few points in his review in the March issue of THE ARYAN PATH? I fully agree with Mr. Richardson as to the striking and instructive quality of the stories by Madame H. P. Blavatsky which fill more than two-thirds of the volume, and the authentic character of which he recognises.

But he is considerably less than just to Mr. Judge, whom Madame Blavatsky herself, in more than one place, has given a status that accords ill with Mr. Richardson's implied estimate.

Any one who has read Mr. Judge's books, *The Ocean of Theosophy, Epitome of Theosophy, Echoes from the Orient* and *Notes on the Bhagavad-Gita*, his English renditions of the *Gita* and the *Yoga Aphorisms* of Patanjali and his letters, published under the title *Letters That Have Helped Me*, must have been impressed, as the writer has been, by his complete sanity and balance, by the remarkable clarity and incisiveness of his thought and by his freedom from any trace of psychism or parade of the knowledge which he obviously possessed. His *Ocean of Theosophy* is a marvellously clear and accurate epitome of Madame Blavatsky's mammoth work *The Secret Doctrine*, which is as vast in its scope as it is profound. His philosophical articles are models of cogent reasoning.

Mr. Judge was devoted heart and soul to the Theosophical Movement. He was no dilettante with time to seek self-expression in fiction. These stories, moreover, be it noted, were all published originally under a pen-name—Bryan Kinnavan. Should the revelation of the identity behind the pseudonym, in a volume published nearly half a century after the author's death, convict him retroactively of self-glorification sprung from self-delusion, as Mr. Richardson seems to imply?

No, another motive must be sought for the writing of these stories. And in that motive lies the clue to their understanding. They are by no means psychic lucubrations. They are not meant to be taken literally. Spiritual laws are adumbrated in them but these narratives are not primarily didactic, not even in the sense in which Madame Blavatsky's might be claimed to be. Nor is their "Celtic Twilight" atmosphere created to evoke a mood. Their purpose seems rather to be to touch and to awaken, however fleetingly, something that lies within and above the reader's mere brain intellect, namely, his spiritual intuition. To read them with an eye mainly to literary criticism might well be to raise a barrier to their penetration to that inner consciousness.

A STUDENT OF THEOSOPHY

Bombay.

"OBSCENITY IN LITERATURE"

Professor Naidu's rejoinder in the March 1944 ARYAN PATH confounds the issue. It is difficult to see how my arguments are *entirely in his favour*. According to him great art is born of a noble sentiment and is appreciated by those who can respond sympathetically; indecent art is the expression of ugly complexes and appeals to minds suffering from similar complexes. Such a proposition implies a vertical division of mankind—between the pure who create and enjoy noble art and the impure who revel in the production and enjoyment of the obscene. If this were true, the obscene in literature, as the Editor in her preamble to Professor Naidu's original article remarks, would be no concern of ours. Thus Professor Naidu's account of the psychological roots of art gives us a somewhat distorted picture of human nature, and fails to bring out fully the insidious nature of indecent art products which sap the foundations of morality and are indeed "unmistakable symptoms of a decadent age."

I, on the contrary, believe that art activity, from the purely psychological point of view, is akin to day-dreaming; both are compensatory in nature and serve to allay mental conflicts. Mental conflict may be the result of faulty organization of the artist's emotional life or it may arise from his dissatisfaction with his environment. Art activity is a process of mental healing, not only of the artist, but also of all who appreciate artistic products. The significance of both the creation and the enjoyment of art lies in its psychotherapeutic value.

In a rapidly changing civilized life like ours mental conflict is almost inevitable. Even the best of us fail to achieve perfect adjustment. The genius of the artist enables him to resolve his conflicts through creative art activity which provides a healthy channel for his baulked instinctive energies. At the same time, those who contemplate works of art are helped to resolve their own mental conflicts because appreciation is essentially a creative activity, the mind of the appreciator going through all the mental processes of the artist and thus recreating the work of art he is contemplating.

Thus my account of mental conditions underlying art activity is in harmony with the nature of appreciation and the true function of art as conceived by eminent art-critics from Aristotle downwards, *viz.*, that of resolving our conflicts through catharsis and thus enabling us to bear the burden of life more easily in this imperfect world.

Indecent art products are also an outcome of mental conflict but they show a regressive tendency inasmuch as they violate the moral standards of society. They are also likely to appeal to a vast majority, because each one of us, as the Editor has wisely observed, has the lower as well as the higher nature in him. That is why the obscene in art calls for severe condemnation from all who have the welfare of humanity at heart.

M. M. SHUKLA

Baroda.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"_____ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS

A ceremony no less significant for the thoughtful than it was colourful for all beholders was performed at Bombay on the 9th of April. Shrimati Sarojini Naidu, poet and patriot, was the recipient of an address presented on behalf of the All-India Women's Conference. Appropriately, over a hundred organisations associated themselves in the enthusiastic tribute to her services: to her country, to her sex and to culture. Her staunch devotion to the ideal of unity for Indians of every creed received a special tribute in the address read on behalf of the Conference by its President, Shrimati Kamaladevi Chattopadhyaya. Tributes were also paid by several independent speakers, who included Lady Premlila Thackersey, Shrimati Rameswari Nehru and Begum Humayun Mirza. A purse also was presented to Shrimati Sarojini Devi.

And the recipient of all these honours, almost buried in garlands and bouquets, what was her response? She could only bow and smile her gratitude. She did not even frame the words "Thank you!"—an eloquent answer to the Government ban. Her lips were silenced but her heart accepted the tributes as not only for herself but also for her colleagues still behind the bars. Her heart answered, for both herself and them, the voice of India speaking at that meeting—and India heard.

The interesting and varied programme, from 7th to 10th April, of the Seventeenth Session of the All-India Women's Conference included, besides the formal meetings, lectures and social entertainment features, and an Arts and Crafts Exhibition. There were interesting and challenging addresses at the opening meeting. These included, besides the addresses of the outgoing President, Shrimati Vijayalaxmi Pandit and the Chairman of the Reception Committee, Lady Thackersey, those of Mr. M. R. Masani, Mayor of Bombay, Mr. Justice M. C. Chagla, Mr. B. J. Wadia, Shri Bhulabhai J. Desai and Sir Sitaram Patkar.

Several constructive resolutions were passed, upholding monogamy, advocating adequate medical facilities for all, etc. But perhaps the most valuable service of the session was the placing of the women's movement in its proper setting.

The effectiveness of any grouping smaller than the human family is measured by its recognition of the limitations which its partial character imposes and the effort which it makes to take the wider view. Souls and minds are more important than the pattern of the body that envelopes them, though differences between average men and women do go deeper than the physical. Roughly speaking, we might say that men have more of positiveness, whether on the right side of initiative or the wrong side of

aggression, and women more of negativity, whether on the right side of openness to intuitive perceptions or on the wrong side of passivity and resistance to change.

But the women's movement, rightly understood, is neither a fad nor a fancy, least of all a rebellion against the opposite sex. It is, as Shrimati Kamaladevi Chattopadhyaya brought out well in her Presidential Address, an aspect of the world-wide movement for social and economic justice. Not men but faulty institutions were the common foe. The hearts of womankind have an important rôle to play in the amelioration of conditions for the race.

The women's movement represents an urge of the rising cycle. The speeches at the Conference turned largely around improvement of conditions in the poverty-stricken villages of India, around provision for an economic order that would recognise the dignity of labour, around insistence that increased production without fair distribution could offer no solution of our economic ills, around the right of children to a better chance in life.

Prof. Wilbur Long in his discussion of "Personalism in Oriental Thought" in the Winter 1944 *Personalist* treats chiefly of China and India. If personalism be understood to mean, as Professor Long implies, "the doctrine of the moral and metaphysical worth and dignity of every person" the personalist resources of Asia are indeed considerable. Confucius pronounced good men the chief wealth of a nation. Humaneness, brotherhood, he saw as the root of life, material prosperity as its leafage. Motze declared that there would be prosperity when each worked for the common good in the social station and the calling to which he was by nature suited. Mencius defined the Path of Life as "living in harmony with our nature. Learning to follow the Path is called education." His fine sense of values comes out in these words:—

> I like life and I like right too. If I cannot have both, I leave life and take the right. I like life indeed, but I like some things more than life.

These are all paralleled in Indian teaching. But Professor Long seems less than just to Indian thought and particularly to the *Bhagavad-Gita*, whose message suffers only less distortion from what he praises in it than from what he blames. For example, he commendingly reads into it the proposition that "finite souls are real." This unqualified statement would be challenged by those who find confirmation in the *Gita* for the view that metaphysically the only permanent Reality is the unchanging background of manifestation, the one hidden absolute existence. More serious, however, is the unfair charge that the *Gita's* teaching "is defective from the standpoint of personalistic ethics, since it sanctions the caste system and advises indifference to the fate of other men." But caste as described in the *Gita* is not the rigid hereditary system of today; only a classification of mankind by natural qualities with corresponding duties, a division which exists throughout the world. Thus Prof. Long is a Brahmana! The *Gita* does exhort to equanimity and recognition of the just, unerring moral law. But hard-heartedness is not the price of equanimity, or "doing service" would not be laid

down as the first of the steps to spiritual wisdom or devotion to the good of all creatures as a prerequisite for the final consummation—direct knowledge of Self.

It is gratifying that some Western minds are waking up a little to the wealth and to the message of Eastern thought. Anthologies of Oriental literature and philosophy like Lin Yutang's *The Wisdom of China and India*, to which we referred in our January editorial, are attracting enlightened attention. But Mr. Charles S. Braden's remarks on the above work in the January 1944 *Review of Religion*, though generally appreciative, yet give an indication that such recognition in the West is not yet general or quite spontaneous. Most who exhibit an interest in things Eastern seem moved more by academic curiosity than by any genuine hope that the Eastern approach to the fundamentals of life may give the contemporary world the blue print for living that it so sorely needs. More often than not the West's attitude is condescending, like Mr. Braden's conclusion :—

> It would be difficult for one who reads long in these writings to continue to think of the people of China and India as an inferior people, unworthy to be admitted to our country and to become citizens thereof.

This, to say the least, is damning with faint praise !

Mr. Braden quotes with approval, from the introduction to this excellent anthology, Mr. Lin Yutang's assessment of philosophy in the West :—

> There are professors of philosophy but there are no philosophers....We need a philosophy of living and we clearly have not got it. The Western man has tons of philosophy written by French, German, English and American philosophers, but still he has not got a philosophy when he wants it. In fact he seldom wants it.

"It will be good for the souls of Americans and Westerners generally," exclaims Mr. Braden, "to read Lin Yutang's introduction." And the philosophical and ethical contents ? He praises the collection as a whole for "entertainment, instruction, spiritual insight, beauty, and charm," and as "the best that the two great cultures of the East have thus far produced." Does he imply that we may yet improve upon the *Gita* and Laotse ?

Convinced as we are that decentralised production is better suited to our country's genius than large-scale industries, we have been glad to see the Draft Constitution of the Indian Industrial Co-operatives Association. It is concrete evidence that the body recently formed to spread the idea and the practice of decentralised production has not, like so many groups of well-wishers, spent all its force in the initial effort.

This draft constitution is designed to provide a framework for a country-wide network of autonomous and yet co-ordinated industrial co-operatives.

China has worked wonders with her new industrial co-operatives and it is natural that Indians should hope for similar benefits for our country from a like development. But conditions here are different. China has a national government, keenly interested in the industrial progress of the country on sound lines. National leaders have backed the movement with enthusiasm. The Government-sponsored, Government-regulated co-operative movement in India has for many years included

artisans' societies for thrift and self-help in its purview, but no development comparable to that in China has taken place. We do not impute motives; we only mention facts.

The emphasis for years was on credit—and we do not minimise the importance of credit in the economic pattern. Non-credit societies are being fostered nowadays, but we understand they are chiefly marketing societies for agricultural produce.

The popularity of the industrial co-operatives movement and its success will be in terms of its spontaneity. The artisans must feel that it is their own movement and their own responsibility. It must be built up from below, not lowered from above as a wet blanket to enterprise. But unless the industrial co-operatives contemplated forgo altogether the designation "co-operative" we do not see how, as the law stands at present, they can evade the doubtless well-meaning but perhaps embarrassing paternal "fostering" of the Registrars of Co-operative Societies.

The January *Asiatic Review* reports the views on Anglo-Indian *rapprochement* expressed by Mr. D. L. Murray, Editor of *The Times Literary Supplement*, in his presidential address at the East India Association's London meeting on the 9th of November. He viewed philosophy and metaphysics as the most hopeful approach to mutual understanding between English and Indian thought. He knew that those subjects could only appeal to a small number, but the general thought of philosophers did, he said, in time permeate the mass of the people.

There was an affinity between the classic Indian philosophy and the European tradition of Idealism beginning from Plato and it had often been held that Plato himself had access to Indian teachers and Indian teaching in framing his own thought....The philosophy of Idealism, though it started in Greece and had its next powerful influence in Germany, had always been very much akin to the spirit of Britain and had found expression in the great British idealist philosophers such as Bradley, Bosanquet, Green and others....He hoped that something would be done in the region of philosophy to promote further understanding between the Indian and the English mind.

Mr. Clifford Bax, who followed Mr. Murray, thought that the effect of Indian thought on the British mind was surprisingly small. "To an Englishman like himself who had been deeply affected by Indian philosophy since boyhood, it was irritating to find how the simplest notions of Indian philosophy were misunderstood by so-called intellectuals." He cited the using of the term "Karma" as though it meant reincarnation. He was not, however, without hope for the future.

It was only about sixty years since English art was suddenly affected by the beauty of Japanese and Chinese paintings, and in another fifty years they might realize that the Indian philosophy was a serious matter. The trouble with reviewers was that they had academic minds which regarded Indian thought as an interesting subject for study but not for experiment.